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IS THERE A "RELIGIOUS QUESTION" DOCTRINE?
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO EXAMINE RELIGIOUS
PRACTICES AND BELIEFS
Jared A. Goldstein'
In the familiar 1947 movie Miracle on 34th Street, faith and law come
into comical conflict. As anyone who has seen the movie remembers, the
plot concerns the identity of a jolly, portly, white-bearded old man who
calls himself Kris Kringle and claims to be the one and only Santa Claus.
When the old man's apparent delusion lands him in a state mental
institution, the film's romantic lead, a lawyer, sets out to free him. An
involuntary commitment hearing is called to determine the purported
Santa's sanity, and the old man's lawyer sets out to prove that his client is
the true Santa. The district attorney argues that the existence of Santa
Claus is not a proper subject for judicial inquiry. The judge considers
this but rules that the existence of Santa Claus is a factual issue to be
resolved through evidence. The question of proof is somewhat difficult:
how can the existence of Santa Claus be established using the tools of law
when, as our lawyer-hero explains, belief in Santa Claus is based on faith,
and faith "means believing in things when common sense tells you not
to"?'
Fortunately for movie watchers, the writers of Miracle on 34th Street
were unfamiliar with the principle that courts are prohibited from
resolving religious questions. Three years before the release of the
movie, the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Ballard,2
which declares that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment cordon
off a "forbidden domain" that judges and juries may not enter: they may
not attempt to determine the "truth or falsity" of religious claims . Since
Ballard, the Court has greatly expanded its articulation of this
prohibition, stating that not only are courts prohibited from attempting
to determine the truth of religious beliefs, but also they may not seek to
+ Associate, Shearman & Sterling, LLP; Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams
University School of Law (beginning Fall 2005). B.A. 1990, Vassar College; J.D. 1994,
University of Michigan. I am grateful for comments on earlier drafts by Jonathan
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1. MIRACLE ON 34TH STREET (20th Century Fox 1947).
2. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
3. Id. at 87.
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resolve "controversies over religious doctrine and practice,"4 may not
undertake "interpretation of particular church doctrines and the
importance of those doctrines to the religion," 5 may make "no inquiry
into religious doctrine,"6 and may give "no consideration of doctrinal
matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.
' 7
Courts are thus said to be barred from resolving all questions about
religious practices and doctrine. If the existence of Santa Claus is a
religious question, courts may not answer it.
In Employment Division v. Smith,8 the Supreme Court indicated that
the prohibition against judicial resolution of religious questions should be
understood to apply broadly and absolutely.9 Since that decision in 1990,
lower courts have relied on the prohibition to dismiss a wide range of
otherwise ordinary disputes, whenever their resolution would require
examination of religious matters. Courts deem contracts unenforceable
when they contain religious terms that might require judicial
construction." In child custody and divorce cases, courts refuse to
determine whether custodial parents abided by prenuptial or divorce
agreements mandating that children be raised in a particular religion
because it would require courts to examine religious questions." Courts
have refused to adjudicate negligence claims against churches, religious
therapists, and faith healers because of the difficulties of determining the
reasonableness of a religious actor's conduct without examining religious
standards.12 Courts have held unenforceable consumer fraud statutes
prohibiting the false labeling of food to be kosher under Orthodox
Jewish dietary standards because, among other reasons, such statutes call
on courts to examine religious doctrines and practices to determine
whether the food actually complies with Jewish law.13  Employment
discrimination claims against religious organizations are frequently
dismissed because they might call upon courts to evaluate whether
14
religious doctrines played any role in the employment decisions at issue .A broad prohibition on judicial examination of religious questions thus
4. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
5. Id. at 450.
6. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership v. Church
of God, 396 U.S. 367,368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
7. Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring).
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. Id. at 887-88.
10. See infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
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has had the effect of immunizing from judicial review a wide range of
conduct simply because examining the conduct could entail examining
religious beliefs or practices.
As several commentators have noted, the prohibition on judicial
inquiry into religious questions has much in common with the political
question doctrine."5 Just as the Constitution gives the political branches,
and not the courts, the authority to resolve political questions, so the
Constitution can be understood to leave questions about religion to
religious bodies. It is appealing to believe that, just as Marbury v.
Madison16 declares that there are questions "in their nature political" and
therefore unsuitable to judicial resolution, so there are questions that by
their nature are religious and likewise off-limits to the courts. 7 Courts
have no business deciding whether to declare war or impose taxes; nor
should courts have any role in deciding what prayers should be said in
church or who should be elected Pope.
Like the political question doctrine, the prohibition on judicial inquiry
into religious questions is understood to be a justiciability doctrine-once
it becomes apparent that the resolution of a case would require a court to
undertake examination of religious matters, the court has no choice but
to dismiss the case.' 8 The prohibition on judicial examination of religious
questions is also said to rest on two considerations analogous to
prominent considerations in the political question doctrine. First, courts
15. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of
Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 132 (1989) ("The Court has developed a
religion clause analogue to the political question doctrine that [applies when the resolution
of litigation] depends upon interpretation of religious doctrine ...."); Scott C. Idleman,
Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J.
219, 220 (2000) ("Broadly conceptualized, this restriction amounts to a general prohibition
on the adjudication of religious questions, not unlike the Article III prohibition on the
adjudication of so-called political or nonjusticiable questions."); Jonathan Weiss, Privilege,
Posture, and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 599 (1964) (stating that
the Court has held that the "first amendment compels religious reservation-any
examination of a religion's 'truth' for whatever purpose is forbidden by the Constitution");
Bernard Roberts, Note, The Common Law Sovereignty of Religious Lawfinders and the
Free Exercise Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 211, 226 (1991) ("Perhaps the model of a 'religious
question doctrine,' analogous to one version of the political question doctrine, will help to
illuminate the civil courts' habit of refraining from inquiry into matters of religious law.").
16. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
17. Id. at 170.
18. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-11, at
1236 (2d ed. 1988) (describing religious questions as "non-justiciable"); Carl H. Esbeck,
The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 42-49 (1998); Gedicks, supra note 15, at 132 (stating that when cases call upon
courts to interpret religious doctrine they "generally must abstain from adjudicating the
case rather than rendering the interpretation itself, because theological and ecclesiastical
questions are not justiciable").
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are said to be incompetent to resolve religious questions," just as courts• 21
are said to be incompetent to resolve political questions. Second, the
prohibition on judicial resolution of religious questions reflects a concern
about separation of powers-in this case, between church and state-just
as the political question doctrine reflects concerns over the separation of
powers between the judicial and the political branches .
The post-Smith adoption of a broad prohibition on judicial inquiry into
religious questions has received little attention in the courts and
academic literature. To be sure, many articles have examined how the
prohibition should be applied in various contexts. Some commentators
have thus argued that kosher food laws are consistent with constitutional
limitations on the courts' authority, while others have taken a contrary
view.22 Commentators have likewise taken differing positions on how the
prohibition should be applied in adjudicating employment discrimination
claims against religious entities, negligence claims against religious
actors, contract claims involving religious terms, and child custody cases,
among other subjects.23  Considerable attention has been given to how
19. James Madison declared the proposition that a "Civil Magistrate is a competent
Judge of Religious truth" to be "an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory
opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world." JAMES MADISON, Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
295, 301 (Robert A. Rultand et al. eds., 1973); see also infra notes 199-201 and
accompanying text.
20. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
21. See TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1226 ("The doctrines that prohibit excessive church-
state entanglement reflect the Madisonian concern that secular and religious authorities
must not interfere with each other's respective spheres of choice and influence."); see also
Esbeck, supra note 18, at 42-45, 47. See generally Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (stating that
courts lack competence to resolve political questions because of a "lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards").
22. See infra note 148.
23. See Joanne C. Brant, "Our Shield Belongs to the Lord": Religious Employers and
a Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 276-77, 280-83
(1994); Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract, and the
First Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 338-40 (1992); Laura L. Coon, Employment
Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the Constitutional
Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 481,
484-86 (2001); Thomas J. Cunningham, Considering Religion as a Factor in Foster Care in
the Aftermath of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 53, 79-85 (1994); Idleman,
supra note 15, at 231-39; David J. Overstreet, Note, Does the Bible Preempt Contract
Law?: A Critical Examination of Judicial Reluctance to Adjudicate a Cleric's Breach of
Employment Contract Claim Against a Religious Organization, 81 MINN. L. REV. 263,265-
66 (1996); Jeremy Pomeroy, Note, Reason, Religion, and Avoidable Consequences: When
Faith and the Duty to Mitigate Collide, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1111, 1111, 1114 (1992). At least
two articles have addressed the prohibition in greater depth. See Kent Greenawalt,
Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices with
Religious Significance, 71 CAL. L. REV. 781 (1998); Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the
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statutes addressing religion can be construed consistently with the
24prohibition. But with the adoption of an apparently absolute judicial
prohibition on the resolution of all religious questions, the time has come
to ask a much more basic question, much as Louis Henkin asked with
regard to the political question doctrine in 1976: is there a religious
question doctrine?
25
As a purely descriptive matter, it is clear that the courts believe that
such a doctrine exists and routinely dismiss cases for no other identifiable
reason than that adjudication would require inquiry into religious
matters. This Article argues, however, that it is incoherent to speak of a
general prohibition on judicial examination of religious questions. There
are numerous contexts in which courts routinely and legitimately
undertake factual inquiries into religious doctrines and practices. The
question is not whether courts may resolve religious questions but which
religious questions lie beyond judicial ability and authority. This Article
answers that question by arguing that, for both institutional and
constitutional reasons, courts are barred from resolving normative
questions about religion, such as the validity or truth of religious beliefs
or the wisdom or efficacy of religious practices, but neither the
institutional competence of the courts nor the separationist principle
embodied in the Establishment Clause bars judicial resolution of positive
religious questions, such as assessments of the content of religious
doctrine, or determinations of the centrality or importance of a religious
practice within the context of a religion. In other words, on religious
matters, courts may not tell people what they should do or believe, but
they may determine, in the sense of making factual findings, what beliefs
people hold and what practices they engage in.
Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85 (1997). Neither of those articles, however, advances a generally
applicable principle for distinguishing when courts may and may not examine religious
questions. A third article, Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State's
Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645 (2004), LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Uclalr File, was published too late in the editing process of the present
Article to allow the author to respond to it fully. Professor Garnett does not take issue
with the scope or validity of what he terms "the well-settled 'no religious decisions'
principle." Id. at 1647. Professor Garnett instead argues that the content of religious
doctrine is a subject about which the government has substantial interests. See id. at 1650.
24. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is
Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 1, 6-7 (1998); Gregory P. Magarian, How to
Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the
Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1904, 1945-62 (2001); Steven C. Seeger, Note,
Restoring Rights to Rites: The Religious Motivation Test and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1472, 1498-506 (1997).
25. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597,
597 (1976).
20051
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Part I of this Article traces the evolution of the prohibition on judicial
examination of religious questions. As this Part shows, the scope of the
prohibition has increased exponentially in recent years, with little
discussion or dissent. Prior to Ballard, courts had long applied a limited
common law principle of deference to ecclesiastical judgments, which
barred courts from second-guessing the doctrinal decisions of church
bodies.26 Beginning in the 1960s, with the Court's decision in cases
addressing disputes over the ownership of church property and
culminating in the Smith decision in 1990, the principle has grown to an
apparently absolute prohibition on judicial examination of all questions
touching on religion. Courts are thus said to be equally barred from
determining normative questions, such as whether Jesus really was the
Messiah or whether Devil's Tower really is sacred, as they are barred
from determining positive questions, such as whether throwing rice is
considered a central part of a wedding ceremony or whether Jews
consider pork to be kosher.
Part II shows that, contrary to the Court's language, an absolute
prohibition on judicial examination of religious questions is neither
possible nor advisable. There are substantial contexts in which courts
legitimately inquire into religious questions and could not apply the
Religion Clauses, or the hundreds of statutes that give special treatment
to religion and religious practices, if they were prohibited from doing so.
Most prominently, any determination of whether a belief or practice is
"religious" and therefore subject to the Free Exercise Clause or the
Establishment Clause necessarily entails inquiry into the content of
religious doctrines and practices, and courts routinely make such
inquiries, notwithstanding the apparent prohibition on judicial
examination of religious questions.
Part III examines the argument that courts are institutionally
incompetent to resolve religious questions. This rationale for prohibiting
judicial assessment of religious questions depends crucially on a
conception of law and religion as epistemologically distinct spheres-that
is, that the validity of religious claims depends on faith, miracles, mystical
experiences, and other nonrational sources, while law discovers truth
exclusively through reason and empiricism. Under this conception,
courts cannot resolve religious questions because they are not susceptible
to the analytical tools available through law. To the extent this
understanding of the difference between religious and legal thinking is
correct, it counsels in favor of a prohibition on judicial resolution of
normative questions about religion. In contrast, positive religious
questions, such as those concerning the content of religious beliefs or the
26. See infra Part I.A.
[Vol. 54:497
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importance of a religious practice within the context of a religion, do not
call on courts to employ anything other than ordinary tools of judicial
fact-finding and can be resolved through resort to traditional evidence,
such as reliance on expert witnesses, treatises, and factual testimony.
Part IV examines the argument, based on the separationist principle
embodied in the Establishment Clause, that courts are barred from
resolving religious questions because such questions are constitutionally
committed to religious bodies. While a judicial determination that a
religious claim is true or valid would necessarily intrude into the sphere
of religion protected by the Constitution, courts neither become
excessively entangled in religious matters nor endorse religious doctrines
merely by describing them in positive terms. The Religion Clauses are
thus properly understood to prohibit judicial determinations of the truth
or validity of religious claims but not to prohibit courts from making
positive assessments of the content of religious doctrine and practices.
I. THE CREATION AND EXPANSION OF THE PROHIBITION ON JUDICIAL
EXAMINATION OF RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, American
common law included a generally applicable principle that courts should
avoid deciding certain kinds of religious questions out of respect for the
separate authority of religious bodies.27 In the last sixty years, that
limited principle has grown into a seemingly absolute prohibition on all
judicial inquiry into questions touching on religion, regardless of the type
of question or how the question arises. The expansion began in 1944
with the Court's decision in Ballard, when the Supreme Court held that
the Free Exercise Clause prohibits courts from determining the truth or
validity of religious claims. 8 Twenty-five years later, the Court declared
that the Establishment Clause prohibits courts from interpreting the
meaning of religious terms or weighing the importance of doctrines or
practices in the context of a religion. 29 Although that principle was
articulated in broad terms, for the next twenty years the Court appeared
ambivalent about the precise scope of the prohibition on judicial
resolution of religious questions, and the Court continued to examine the
meaning and context of religious doctrines and practices in determining
30
numerous cases.
27. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733-34 (1871).
28. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 79, 88 (1944).
29. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'I Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 441, 452 (1969).
30. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1989); Hernandez
v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 683-84 (1989); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
2005]
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That changed in 1990, with the Court's decision in Smith, which holds
that courts may not examine or weigh the importance of religious
practices in determining whether an individual's rights to the free
exercise of religion were violated.3' Smith's conclusion has been
understood by the lower courts to evince an absolute prohibition on
judicial examination of religious questions. Applying that prohibition,
state and federal courts have dismissed scores of otherwise ordinary
disputes-involving consumer fraud, child custody, employment
discrimination, negligence, professional malpractice, and contracts-
whenever their resolution would require any analysis of religious
questions."
A. The Common Law Origins of the Prohibition on Judicial Examination
of Religious Questions
The principle that civil courts have no authority to adjudicate religious
disputes dates back to medieval England, when church courts and crown
courts existed side by side and had relatively distinct areas of jurisdiction.
As Roscoe Pound described:
In the politics and law of the Middle Ages the distinction
between the spiritual and the temporal, between the jurisdiction
of religiously organized Christendom and the jurisdiction of the
temporal sovereign, that is, of a politically organized society,
was fundamental. It seemed as natural and inevitable to have
church courts and state courts, each with their own field of
action and each, perhaps, tending to encroach on the other's
domain, but each having their own province in which they were
paramount, as it seems to Americans to have two sets of courts,
federal courts and state courts, operating side by 3side in the
same territory, each supreme in their own province.
Under the dual legal system in place in medieval England, common law
courts, under the domain of the King, had jurisdiction over temporal
matters and lacked authority to decide religious questions because such
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1987); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 580-82 (1987); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375, 397-98 (1985),
overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736, 739, 766-67 (1976); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
697-98 (1976).
31. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874, 890 (1990).
32. See supra note 23.
33. Roscoe Pound, A Comparison of Ideals and Law, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1933).
See generally J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 146-52 (3d
ed. 1990); Kenneth R. O'Brien & Daniel E. O'Brien, Restatement of Inter-Church-and-
State Common Law, 5 JURIST 73 (tracing the history of the Catholic Church's supreme
authority over internal church matters, free from secular supervision).
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questions properly fell under the jurisdiction of the church and its own
system of canon courts.
The longstanding division of authority between the crown's courts and
the church courts formed the background for the rejection in the
seventeenth and eighteenth century of civil authority over questions of
faith. John Locke argued that civil courts had no authority to measure
religious truth because such matters fell under the authority of religious
bodies and the individual conscience: "And upon this ground, I affirm
that the magistrate's power extends not to the establishing of any articles
of faith, or forms of worship, by the force of his laws., 34 This principle
was generally accepted throughout the American Colonies. Roger
Williams thus wrote in 1644 that civil courts have no authority to judge
the truth of religious convictions: "All civil states with their officers of
justice, in their respective constitutions and administrations, are . . .
essentially civil, and therefore not judges, governors, or defenders of the
Spiritual, or Christian, State and worship."35 James Madison likewise
relied on what was by then a well-established principle in his Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, declaring the
proposition that a "Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious
truth" to be "an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory
opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world. 36
Pursuant to the principle that civil courts have no authority over
religious matters, nineteenth century courts refused to address the truth
of religious doctrines,37 to decide whether the Christian sacraments had
been properly administered,38 to enforce spiritual obligations,39 or to
compel church officials to perform religious duties. 4  When such
questions about religion arose, the courts deferred to the final decisions
of religious authorities, just as the common law courts of England would
have deferred to church courts on matters within their jurisdiction.
In ways that plainly would be anathema under contemporary
understandings of the place of religion in law, American courts in the
34. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1690), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 52 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
35. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOODY TENENT, OF PERSECUTION FOR CAUSE OF
CONSCIENCE (1644), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 34, at 48.
36. MADISON, supra note 19.
37. See, e g., Trustees of E. Norway Lake Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Halvorson, 44 N.W. 663, 665, 667 (Minn. 1890).
38. Reformed Protestant Dutch Church v. Bradford, 457 Cow. 525-26 (N.Y. 1826).
39. Congregation of the Roman Catholic Church v. Martin, 1843 La. LEXIS 25, at
*13-14 (La. Feb. 1843).
40. Ferraria v. Vasconcellos, 1863 WL 3069, at *7 (Il. Jan. 1863). See generally
WILLIAM GEORGE TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA
138-41 (1948).
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nineteenth century understood the bar on examining the truth of
religious doctrines to be necessary to protect the dominant position of
Christianity. Christianity was said to be part of the common law and, as
a result, the truth of Christian doctrines could not be challenged in
court.4' Blasphemy against Christianity and the Christian Bible remained
a common law crime until the early twentieth century, 42 and convictions
were upheld for calling Jesus a bastard,43 for characterizing the Bible to
be a fable," and for publishing a satire of the New Testament.45 Alleged
blasphemers could not defend themselves on the ground that they had
46
spoken the truth. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained in
1824, if the truth of Christian beliefs were open to attack in court, no
testimony could be credited because of the requirement that witnesses
swear an oath of truthfulness on the Christian Bible:
[A]ll false oaths, all tests by oath, in the common form, by the
book, would cease to be indictable as perjury; the indictment
must state the oath to be on the holy Evangelists of Almighty
God; the accused, on his trial, might argue that the book by
which he was sworn, so far from being holy writ, was a pack of
lies, containing as little truth as Robinson Crusoe. And is every
41. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) ("[T]his
is a Christian nation."); Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 1824 WL 2393, at *5 (Pa. Sept. 13,
1824) ("Christianity, general Christianity, is and always has been a part of the common law
of Pennsylvania,... not Christianity with an established church and tithes and spiritual
courts; but Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men."); 15A AM. JUR. 2D
Christianity § 8 (2000) ("[1]t has been said that general Christianity is, and always has
been, a part of the common law .... ). See generally Stuart Banner, When Christianity
Was Part of the Common Law, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 27,57 (1998).
42. See Banner, supra note 41, passim (discussing the historical idea that the Christian
religion was part of the common law and thoroughly exploring blasphemy and its
relationship to the old maxim); Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Validity of Blasphemy
Statutes or Ordinances, 41 A.L.R. 3D 519 (1972) (identifying a collection of cases regarding
the validity of blasphemy statutes and ordinances). See generally CHARLES E. TORCIA, 4
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 532 (14th ed. 1981) (defining blasphemy as "maliciously
reviling God or religion [and] involves speaking evil of the Deity with an impious purpose
to derogate from the divine Majesty" (citation omitted)). Blasphemy was understood to
be a secular crime, not a religious offense, because public ridicule of Christianity was seen
as a threat to the peace due to Christianity's dominant position. See Updegraph, 1824 WL
2393, at *4 (stating that Christianity "is the popular religion of the country, an insult on
which would be indictable, as directly tending to disturb the public peace"); TORPEY,
supra note 40, at 59 ("Blasphemy is a temporal offense. Violation of religious precepts
will not be punished as such. Punishment follows because such attacks tend to destroy the
peace of society.").
43. People v. Ruggles, 1811 N.Y. LEXIS 124, at *4-5, *13 (N.Y. Aug. 1811).
44. Updegraph, 1824 WL 2393, at *4.
45. State v. Mockus, 113 A. 39, 40,45 (Me. 1921).
46. See Updegraph, 1824 WL 2393, at *8.
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jury in the box to decide as a fact whether the scriptures are of
divine origin?
47
Judicial examination of the validity of Christian teachings was thus
prohibited because the truth of Christian doctrine was understood to be
an unchallengeable foundation of the law.
The principle that courts could not delve into religious questions did
not, however, preclude judicial pronouncements on the falsity of
religious doctrines and practices outside mainstream Christianity. For
instance, in 1922 an Oklahoma prosecution for fortune-telling was
upheld against a practitioner of Spiritualism, notwithstanding the
defendant's claim that her religion involved the practice of
communicating with departed spirits.48 The court doubted the contention
that communicating with spirits was a protected form of religious
freedom, describing the defendant's avowed religion as "a system of
speculative philosophy, attended with superstitious credulity and . . .
tinged with hypocrisy., 49  Other courts characterized claims of
supernatural abilities to contact the dead, or to heal illnesses through
psychic powers, to be fraudulent, ° as something only lunatics could
believe.5
In addition to protecting the dominant role of Christianity, the
reluctance of nineteenth-century courts to resolve religious questions
served the Madisonian goal of maintaining the distinct spheres of religion
and law. In 1872, in Watson v. Jones, 2 the Supreme Court held, as a
matter of federal common law, that courts should not resolve property
disputes between rival church bodies by reference to religious doctrines.53
The case arose as a result of a schism among a church's members over
the issue of slavery, which resulted in two competing groups claiming
47. Id.; see also Mockus, 113 A. at 43 (defending the position of Christianity as part of
the common law on the ground that "[j]udicial tribunals, anxious to discover and apply the
truth ... require those who are to give testimony in courts of justice to be sworn by an
oath which recognizes deity").
48. McMasters v. State, 207 P. 566, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 1922).
49. Id. Contra id. at 570 (Matson, J., concurring) ("Can the state constitutionally
prohibit communication with the spirit world, with which, so far as I am advised, we are at
peace?").
50. Fay v. Lambourne, 108 N.Y.S. 874, 876 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908).
51. Post v. United States, 135 F. 1, 10-11 (5th Cir. 1905) (sustaining a prosecution
against a practitioner of spiritual healing in which the government bore the burden of
proving that the defendant did not actually possess the power to heal diseases through
mental powers alone); People v. Elmer, 67 N.W. 550, 551 (Mich. 1896). See generally
Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Regulation of Astrology, Clairvoyancy, Fortunetelling, and
the Like, 91 A.L.R. 3D 766 (1979).
52. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
53. Id. at 733-34.
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ownership of the church property.54 The Supreme Court overturned the
lower court's ruling that the property belonged to the group that more
closely followed the original teachings of the church.5 Watson reaches
this conclusion as a matter of the relative jurisdictions of civil courts and
religious authorities, stating that "civil courts exercise no jurisdiction"
over disputes that are "strictly and purely ecclesiastical in [their]
character," because such matters must be left to church authorities to
resolve. 6
In ruling that the property dispute should not be decided based on a
court's assessment of the litigants' adherence to church doctrines, Watson
emphasizes that courts are not absolutely barred from examining
religious doctrines in other contexts. 7 The Court contrasted judicial
reliance on religious doctrine in deciding a dispute between competing
church sects with the hypothetical case of a "pious man" who placed
property in trust in a written instrument specifying that it be used by a
congregation committed to Trinitarian Christianity.58 In the latter case,
the Watson Court stated, courts should be available to "prevent that
property from being used as a means of support and dissemination of the
Unitarian doctrine."5 9 A court's duty in that hypothetical case would be
"to inquire whether the party accused of violating the trust is holding or
teaching a different doctrine." 6  Watson thus holds that fidelity to
religious doctrines cannot serve as a rule of decision for adjudicating
property disputes, but courts may nonetheless inquire into questions of
religious doctrine and practice when such questions arise in the ordinary
course of litigation and do not require judgments about the relative
merits of religious claims.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, American law had thus
developed a common law principle that the civil courts had no authority
over religious matters and that courts therefore should avoid resolving
religious questions in deference to proper church authorities. This
principle had limited applications: it prevented courts from directly
meddling in the internal affairs of mainstream Christian churches and
prevented parties from challenging the truth of Christian doctrines. The
principle did not prevent courts from declaring non-Christian religious
claims to be false, nor was it understood to prevent courts from making
factual inquiries into religious doctrines and practices, Christian and
54. Id. at 690-92.
55. See id. at 733-34.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 723.
58. Id.
59. id.
60. Id. at 724.
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otherwise, when such questions arose in the ordinary course of litigation
and did not call on courts to make judgments about the merits of
religious doctrines and practices.
B. The Expansion of the Prohibition Against Judicial Resolution of
Religious Questions
Beginning with Ballard, decided in 1944, the Supreme Court issued a
series of cases that constitutionalized and greatly expanded the principle
that courts should not delve into questions of religious doctrine. In
Ballard, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause bars courts from
determining the validity or truth of religious claims or doctrines." In
1969, in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church,62 the Court announced a much more sweeping
rule-that the Establishment Clause bars factual inquiry into the content
of religious doctrines or practices, either to interpret religious doctrine or
to determine the relative importance or centrality of a particular
63
religious belief or practice to a believer. In the twenty years following
Presbyterian Church, however, the Court did not apply the rule literally
and instead continued to inquire into the content and context of religious
doctrines and practices in cases under the Free Exercise Clause and other
areas.64 That changed in 1990, with Smith, in which the Court relied on
the broad prohibition against judicial inquiry into religious questions to
substantially revise Free Exercise doctrine.
1. United States v. Ballard: The Constitutional Prohibition on Judicial
Assessment of Religious Truths
Ballard arose out of charges of mail fraud against followers of Guy
Ballard, founder of the I Am movement. 65 According to the indictment,
members of the I Am movement mailed literature in which they claimed
that Ballard had been chosen by Saint Germain to transmit divine
messages to mankind, that the tracts of the I Am movement had been
dictated directly by Jesus, and that, by virtue of his supernatural
attainments, Ballard possessed the power to cure diseases and heal
injuries.6' The indictment alleged that Ballard's followers knew these
61. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
62. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
63. See id. at 449-50.
64. See infra Part I.B.3.
65. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 79. A fascinating examination of the factual background
to the Ballard case and the history of the I Am movement can be found in JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 141-56 (1998). See also Weiss, supra note 15, at 593-94.
66. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 79-80.
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claims to be false and made them in order to swindle people of their
money.7 The court of appeals ruled that the defendants could be found
guilty only if the jury determined that the defendants' claims were
factually falsefr5
Reversing, the Supreme Court held that the Religion Clauses prohibit
any inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious claims:
The miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life
after death, the power of prayer are deep in the religious
convictions of many. If one could be sent to jail because a jury
in a hostile environment found those teachings false, little
indeed would be left of religious freedom .... The religious
views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not
preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject
to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity,
then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect.
When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a
forbidden domain. 69
The Supreme Court held that the defendants could be convicted of fraud
if they did not sincerely believe the religious claims they made, without
any inquiry by the jury into the truth of those claims.70
Ballard thus announces that the Constitution cordons off a "forbidden
domain" that courts may not enter: courts may not determine the truth
or falsity of religious claims. Although Ballard is consistent with the
earlier common law prohibition on judicial resolution of religious
questions, it locates a constitutional source for the prohibition-the Free
Exercise Clause and its protection against punishment for holding
religious beliefs offensive to the majority.72
67. Id. at 80.
68. Id. at 83.
69. Id. at 87.
70. Id. at 88. Justice Jackson dissented on the ground that allowing a conviction
based on insincerity does not adequately protect religious freedom. Id. at 92, 95 (Jackson,
J., dissenting). In Justice Jackson's view, the question of whether a defendant acted
sincerely in making a religious claim cannot be sufficiently distinguished from the truth of
the claim. Id. at 92 (Jackson, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the problems associated
with ascertaining religious sincerity, see John T. Noonan, Jr., How Sincere Do You Have
To Be To Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 713, 718-24 (1989). See also Weiss, supra
note 15.
71. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87.
72. Id. at 86.
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2. The Church Property Cases: The Constitutional Prohibition on
Judicial Examination of Religious Doctrines
In a series of cases addressing church property disputes, the Court
constitutionalized and expanded the rule, announced in Watson, that
courts should not resolve property disputes between competing church
factions by reference to religious doctrines.73  The leading case,
Presbyterian Church, arose as a result of a schism in the Presbyterian
Church, in which title to a church was claimed both by the national
church body and by the local church organization, which had broken with
the national church over its decision to ordain women.74 The property
dispute made its way to the Georgia Supreme Court, which applied its
longstanding rule that church property is held in trust for the central
church organization as long as it adheres to the original church
doctrines.75 The Georgia court awarded the property to the local church
on the ground that the national church body had substantially departed
from its doctrines by allowing the ordination of women.76 The Supreme
Court reversed, concluding that "First Amendment values are plainly
jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the
resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and
practice.""
At the level of its holding, Presbyterian Church simply restates Watson,
rejecting Georgia's departure-from-doctrine rule, which allowed a court
faced with a property dispute between church factions to favor the
church body that more closely adhered to the church's original
theological doctrines. Such a substantive rule of decision amounted to a
governmental endorsement of one set of religious factions -conservative
factions-at the expense of progressive factions, violating the principle of
neutrality that the law "is committed to the support of no dogma, the
establishment of no sect."78 Yet, in rejecting the departure-from-doctrine
73. See generally Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular
and Alien Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335 (1986); Robert J. Bohner, Note,
Religious Property Disputes and Intrinsically Religious Evidence: Towards a Narrow
Application of the Neutral Principles Approach, 35 VILL. L. REV. 949 (1990).
74. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 442 & n.1 (1969).
75. See id. at 443-44. Although the departure-from-doctrine rule had been rejected in
Watson, that decision was based on federal common law and was binding on federal courts
only. See id. at 445 n.4.
76. See id. at 443-44.
77. Id. at 444, 449.
78. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871); see also School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 243 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the
Establishment Clause expresses a conviction "requiring on the part of all organs of
government a strict neutrality toward theological questions").
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rule, the Court's decision in Presbyterian Church appears to adopt a
broad rule that the Religion Clauses bar any judicial inquiry into
religious doctrines:
[T]he departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied
trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters at the
very core of a religion -the interpretation of particular church
doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion.
Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing
such a role.79
The Court thus characterized judicial examination of religious questions
as the "forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church
doctrine."8 °
In Presbyterian Church and the subsequent church property cases, the
Court embraced a prohibition on judicial interpretation of religious
doctrine in order to foreclose the possibility that a court might rule that
an authoritative doctrinal decision of a religious body is incorrect."' In
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,82 the Court overturned
the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court that local church property
belonged to the American branch of the Serbian Orthodox Church
rather than to the mother church in Yugoslavia.83 As the Court stated,
the fatal flaw of the Illinois court was that its decision "rests upon an
impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunals of this hierarchical church upon the issues in dispute, and
impermissibly substitutes its own inquiry into church polity and
resolutions based thereon of those disputes. 8 4  These cases can be
understood simply to reject the power of courts to disagree with the
religious judgment of church bodies.
The language of the decisions, however, goes much further in rejecting
judicial examination of religious doctrines. In a one-paragraph
concurrence in Presbyterian Church, Justice Harlan sought to make clear
that the Court's opinion should not be read to preclude a court from
interpreting and enforcing legal documents containing religious terms, at
85least where such terms are express and clear. In holding out the
79. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 450.
80. Id. at 451; see also id. at 450 (holding that the First Amendment prohibits civil
courts from "assessing the relative significance to the religion" of a particular religious
tenet).
81. See id. at 449-50.
82. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
83. Id. at 698.
84. Id. at 708.
85. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 452 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I do not, however,
read the Court's opinion to go further to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
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possibility that a court could construe religious terms appearing in deeds
or wills, Justice Harlan relied on Watson's hypothetical of the "pious
man. '86 Cases following Presbyterian Church, however, eliminate any
residual authority for courts to construe religious terms, however clearly
expressed." The Court approved two methods for resolving church
property disputes, both of which entail "'no inquiry into religious
doctrine," '88 and "'no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the
ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith."'' 9 Courts may either
adopt a policy of deference to the church institution with authority to
decide the property question and underlying religious doctrinal
questions, or courts may decide the property dispute by applying
"neutral principles" of law that do not entail any consideration of
religious doctrinal matters.
In the broad form articulated by the Court in these cases, the
prohibition on judicial examination of religious questions goes far
beyond both the common law prohibition and the rule announced in
Ballard. Whereas Ballard prohibits courts from judging the truth of
religious doctrines, the church property cases bar courts from making any
"inquiry" into religious doctrines, from "interpreting" religious doctrines,
and from determining the "importance" of religious doctrine to
believers.91 The church property cases further alter the constitutional
source of the prohibition. Whereas Ballard is based principally on free
exercise principles, the broad prohibition on judicial examination of
religious questions articulated in the church property cases is grounded
civilian courts from enforcing a deed or will which expressly and clearly lays down
conditions limiting a religious organization's use of the property which is granted.").
86. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
87. See Md. & Va. Eldership v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 369 n.2 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("Only express conditions that may be effected without
consideration of doctrine are civilly enforceable.").
88. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at
368).
89. Id. at 602 (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
90. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976).
For where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry
by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the
highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must
accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the religious
issues of doctrine or polity before them.
td.; Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603 ("The method relies exclusively on objective, well-established
concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to
free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity,
and practice.").
91. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602-04; United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 79, 83-86 (1944).
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primarily on Establishment Clause principles.w Examination of religious
questions is said to involve excessive entanglement with religion and to
be constitutionally assigned to religious authorities.3  The church
property cases thus depart substantially from Watson, which had
announced that religious bodies "come before us in the same attitude as
other voluntary associations." 94 In announcing that courts may not
purport to resolve religious questions, the church property cases
announce a rule uniquely applicable to religious entities.95
3. Thomas, Hernandez, and County of Allegheny: Confusion Over the
Permissible Scope of Judicial Examination of Religious Questions
Although the church property cases broadly declare that courts must
not engage in the "forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church
doctrine, 96 in the first twenty years after issuing those opinions the Court
continued to consider and weigh the importance of religious doctrines
and practices in its analysis of cases under the Religion Clauses. The
rule against judicial review of religious matters appeared to be another
instance of what the Court candidly recognized as its tendency to make
overly broad pronouncements in cases under the Religion Clauses.9"
The Court frequently examined the content of religious doctrines and
practices in Free Exercise Clause cases. Until Smith, the Court applied a
compelling interest test in evaluating free exercise challenges to the
application of neutral governmental laws, requiring courts to assess the
significance of the burden on the plaintiff's religious practice and weigh
92. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602.
93. See id. at 603. There is some dispute among commentators regarding which of the
two Religion Clauses form the basis for the church property cases. Compare Douglas
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373,
1396 (1981) (arguing that the church property cases rest on the Free Exercise Clause
because "the primary constitutional violation [is] interfering with the right of the original
church, which included both factions, to resolve the controversy itself"), with TRIBE, supra
note 18, at 1232-34, 1237-42 (discussing the church property cases as Establishment Clause
cases), and Esbeck, supra note 18, at 42-58 (arguing that the church property cases are
based on the separationist principles of the Establishment Clause).
94. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 714 (1871).
95. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602.
96. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969); see also id. at 450 (holding that the First Amendment prohibits
civil courts from "assessing the relative significance to the religion" of a particular
religious tenet).
97. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664,669 (1970).
98. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 668 ("The considerable internal inconsistency in the
opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping
utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases
but have limited meaning as general principles.").
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that burden against the strength of the government's interest in applying
the neutral law to the challenger. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,99
the Court held that Wisconsin's compulsory education requirement
violated the free exercise rights of the Old Order Amish because the
Amish religion prohibited sending teenagers to public schools.'0 In
order to reach that conclusion, the Court gave careful examination to the
doctrines and practices of Amish religion, noting the "strong evidence of
a sustained faith pervading and regulating [the Amish's] entire mode of
life," and describing the biblical command, "'[B]e not conformed to this
world,"' to be "fundamental to the Amish faith."' '  The Court's free
exercise cases required judicial examination of the content and
significance of religious practices as an essential aspect of the
constitutional test.
102
In several cases following the church property cases, the Court
grappled with the contradiction of both requiring and prohibiting judicial
examination of religious doctrines and practices. For instance, Thomas v.
Review Board""3 involved the free exercise rights of a Jehovah's Witness
who was denied unemployment compensation after quitting his job,
claiming that his religious beliefs forbade him from participating in
military production." 4 To establish that the denial of benefits burdened
his religion, Thomas was required to present some evidence about the
content of his religion-in the words of the Court, to show that he
"terminated his work because of an honest conviction that such work was
forbidden by his religion." 15 The state attempted to rebut Thomas's
characterization of his religious beliefs by demonstrating that the
Jehovah's Witnesses do not actually forbid military work, offering
testimony of one of Thomas's coworkers and fellow Jehovah's Witness.'
6
The Court, however, held that assessing the content of Jehovah's Witness
doctrine was beyond the constitutional competence of the judiciary:
"particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial function
and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow
worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.
Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation. '"' 0 7
99. 406 U.S. 205 (1992).
100. Id. at 214.
101. Id. at 216, 219.
102. See id. at 214; Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Walz, 397 U.S. at 669-70;
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 443-44 (1969).
103. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
104. Id. at 709.
105. Id. at 716.
106. Id. at 715.
107. Id. at 716.
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The contradiction in the Court's requirement that free exercise
plaintiffs demonstrate a burden on their religious beliefs or practices
while simultaneously prohibiting judicial examination of the content and
importance of religious beliefs and practices can be seen most clearly in
the course of a single paragraph in the Court's opinion in Hernandez v.
Commissioner. 's That case involved the disallowance of tax deductions
for "auditing" and "training" sessions mandated by Church of
Scientology teachings.'09 In addressing the claim that the disallowance
violated the taxpayers' free exercise rights, the Court articulated the
constitutional test as follows: "the free exercise inquiry asks whether
government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a
central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling
governmental interest justifies the burden.""'  The Court apparently
recognized that requiring proof that a religious practice is "central" to
the plaintiff's religion might be understood to call for judicial
examination of the content and importance of religious beliefs and
practices, as the next sentence in the opinion seeks to forbid such
examination: "[I]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality
of particular beliefs or practices to a faith."'.. The next two sentences of
the opinion, however, demonstrate that the Court was nonetheless
willing to makes its own assessment of the doctrines and teachings of the
Church of Scientology:
[W]e do, however, have doubts whether the alleged burden
imposed by the deduction disallowance on the Scientologists'
practices is a substantial one. Neither the payment nor the
receipt of taxes is forbidden by the Scientology faith generally,
and Scientology does not proscribe the payment of taxes in
connection with auditing or training sessions specifically."2
Hernandez thus appears to hold that (1) free exercise plaintiffs must
demonstrate that a burdened religious practice or belief is central to his
or her religion, but (2) a court cannot determine whether the practice or
belief actually is central to the plaintiff's religion, yet (3) courts may
nonetheless assess whether the plaintiff's religion would consider the
burden imposed by the challenged governmental action to be substantial.
If nothing else, Hernandez demonstrates that the Court remained baffled
over the extent to which judicial inquiry is allowed into religious
doctrines and practices.
108. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
109. Id. at 683-84.
110. Id. at 699 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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In the same Term that Hernandez was decided, the Court expressed
similar ambivalence about whether it should decide Establishment
Clause cases without examining religious doctrines. In County of
Allegheny v. ACLU,"3 the Court considered the constitutionality of a
display of a creche in a county courthouse and a menorah in a local
government building.114 In deciding whether these displays violated the
Establishment Cause, the Court devoted considerable attention to the
religious meaning and content of the displays. The majority opinion
parsed the phrase appearing on the creche, "Glory to God in the
Highest," to express the sectarian sentiment, "Glory to God because of
the birth of Jesus.""7 The majority concluded that "[t]his praise to God
in Christian terms is indisputably religious.""' 16 Based on its conclusion
that the creche conveyed a "patently Christian message," the majority
found that its display on public property violated the Establishment
Clause.'17 Likewise, in considering the constitutionality of the display of
the menorah, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion examined
voluminous evidence, including expert testimony, regarding the religious
meaning of the menorah."8 Dissenting on the unconstitutionality of the
display of the creche and concurring on the constitutionality of the
display of the menorah, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, criticized the Court for
undertaking the "inappropriate task of saying what every religious
symbol means.... This Court is ill equipped to sit as a national theology
board, and I question both the wisdom and the constitutionality of its
doing so."".9 Justice Blackmun defended his examination of the religious
meaning of the menorah, stating that "[a]ny inquiry concerning the
government's use of a religious object ... requires a review of the factual
record concerning the religious object."2 The Court thus divided over
whether it is constitutionally appropriate for a court to examine the
content of religious doctrines and practices in deciding cases under the
Establishment Clause.
113. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
114. Id. at 578.
115. Id. at 598.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 601-02.
118. Id. at 613, 620-21 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
120. Id. at 614 n.60 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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4. Employment Division v. Smith: The Reshaping of the Free Exercise
Clause to A void Examination of Religious Doctrines and Practices
Although the opinions issued by the Court in the first two decades
following the church property cases express considerable ambivalence
over whether courts are constitutionally allowed to examine the content,
meaning, and importance of religious doctrines and practices, none of the
cases in those decades appear to take literally the church property cases'
broad pronouncements of an absolute prohibition on judicial
examination of religious doctrines and practices. That changed with the
Court's decision in Smith, issued the Term following Hernandez and
Allegheny. Smith broadly holds that courts are constitutionally barred
from making any factual inquiries into the content or significance of
religious doctrines and practices and that, as a result, the standard for
deciding free exercise cases cannot depend on the significance of
religious doctrines and practices in the context of a religion.1
21
In Smith, the Court overturned the compelling interest test applied in
cases like Yoder in large part because it required courts to determine the
significance of religious practices and doctrines. 22 As the Court stated,
"[W]e have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place
of a particular belief in a religion., 123 Because courts must not determine
the religious significance of an allegedly burdened practice, the Court
concluded that "[i]f the 'compelling interest' test is to be applied at all...
it must be applied across the board, to all actions thought to be
religiously commanded.' 24 The Court thus announced that courts are
constitutionally barred from distinguishing religious practices and
doctrines that are central to a religion from those that are trivial-in the
example of the Court, the Free Exercise Clause cannot be read to offer
differing degrees of protection to the practice of throwing rice at
weddings than to the wedding ceremony itself.12  Because courts are
constitutionally barred from determining the significance of religious
practices, they cannot balance the significance of a governmental interest• t26
against the significance of a burdened religious practice.
121. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
122. Id. at 886-87; cf Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79
VA. L. REV. 1, 59 (1993) ("Smith... is a decision about institutional arrangements more
than about substantive merits[,] . . . holding that judicially manageable standards for the
resolution of Free Exercise exemption claims are lacking." (footnotes omitted)).
123. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887.
124. Id. at 888.
125. Id. at 887 n.4.
126. Id. at 889 n.5 ("[I1t is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly
balance against the importance of general laws the significance of religious practice.").
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Disagreeing with the majority's rejection of the compelling interest
test, both the concurring and dissenting Justices nonetheless agreed with
the majority that it is constitutionally impermissible for a court to
determine the importance of a religious practice within the context of a
religion. The most prominent academic critics and defenders of the
decision similarly agreed that the Free Exercise Clause does not require
courts to determine the centrality of religious doctrines and practices.
28
Smith thus confirms that the prohibition against judicial examination
of religious questions articulated in the church property cases should be
understood to be broad and absolute. Whereas the church property
cases applied the prohibition to invalidate a rule of decision calling for
examination of religious doctrines to decide property disputes, Smith
applies the prohibition to cases arising under the Free Exercise Clause,
holding that even in deciding cases about religious freedom, courts
cannot examine the religious content of the practices and doctrines at
issue.129 As the lower courts were quick to grasp, if the content and
significance of religious practices cannot be examined in addressing the
scope of religious freedom, examination of the content and significance
of religious practices and doctrine must be off-limits in all cases in which
such questions could conceivably arise.
127. Id. at 906-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 919 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
128. For instance, Douglas Laycock, a vocal critic of Smith, agreed with the Court that
"[a] threshold requirement of centrality would indeed be a mistake." Douglas Laycock,
The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 32 (1990); see also Kent
Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution of Issues About Religious Conviction, 81 MARQ. L. REV.
461, 470 (1998) ("I am skeptical about the usefulness of requiring a 'central belief or
practice."'); Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of
Religious Liberty, 70 NEB. L. REV. 651, 668 (1991) ("Judicial inquiry into such matters as
how important a specific religious tenet is for a believer or how heavily the government
imposed burden affects a particular individual's adherence to his religious precepts places
the courts in an undesirably intrusive posture."); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1148 (1990) ("[A] court
faced with a free exercise claim is not required to determine, in the abstract . . . how
central a religious practice is."). Similarly, Ira Lupu, generally supportive of Smith, agreed
with the Court that "any imaginable process for resolving disputes over centrality creates
the spectre of religious experts giving conflicting testimony about the significance of a
religious practice, with the state's decisionmaker authoritatively choosing among them."
Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933, 959 (1989).
129. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
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C. "This Court Is Constitutionally Barred from Inquiring into the
Meaning of These Words :3 The Application of an Absolute Prohibition
on Judicial Inquiry into Religious Questions in the Lower Courts
In 1872, in deciding Watson, the Supreme Court stated that cases
involving religious questions were "happily rare in our courts.' 131 Since
the Court's decision in Smith, however, there have been scores of cases
that state and federal courts have characterized as raising religious
questions prohibited to judicial inquiry. The lower courts assume that
Smith and the church property cases establish an absolute prohibition
and routinely dismiss any case that would require judicial inquiry into the
content or significance of religious beliefs and practices. As Laurence
Tribe uncritically stated, "American judicial decisions have tended to
treat anything even resembling inquiry into [religious questions] as part
of the forbidden religious realm.', 132  The expanded prohibition on
judicial examination of religious questions has led state and federal
courts to dismiss disputes in seemingly every area of litigation-including
consumer fraud, child custody and divorce, employment discrimination,
torts, professional malpractice, and contracts-whenever their resolution
would require analysis of religious questions. It has also led courts to
construe statutes to avoid requiring any inquiry into religious questions
and to invalidate statutes that require such inquiry. Below is a
representative sampling of the cases.
1. Contract Cases
In numerous cases, contracts have been deemed unenforceable
because they contain religious terms that courts have held they are
barred from construing. For instance, in Elmora Hebrew Center, Inc. v.
Fishman,33 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a
breach of contract action involving a contract requiring a rabbi to
"perform all normal rabbinical duties incumbent upon a Rabbi of a
traditional Jewish Congregation.''134  As the court held, judicial
construction of the contract would require the court to make "incursions
into religious questions that would be impermissible under the first
amendment."'35  Similarly, in Pearson v. Church of God,' a retired
minister argued that he was entitled to a pension under the terms of the
130. Pearson v. Church of God, 458 S.E.2d 68, 70 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995), afird, 478
S.E.2d 849 (S.C. 1996).
131. Watson v. Jones, 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) 679, 713 (1872).
132. TRIBE, supra note 18, n.67.
133. 593 A.2d 725 (N.J. 1991).
134. Id. at 727.
135. Id. at 730.
136. 458 S.E.2d 68 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995), affd, 478 S.E. 2d 849 (S.C. 1996).
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pension agreement because he maintained a "ministry" even though his
"pastoral license" had been revoked . Concluding that the relevant
terms in the pension agreement were religious, the court dismissed the
case, stating that "this court is constitutionally barred from inquiring into
the meaning of these words. 1 38 Courts thus profess a complete inability
to construe the meaning of religious terms and dismiss any contract
action calling for construction of religious terms. 139
2. Family Law Cases
Questions about religion frequently arise in child custody cases, when
one parent attempts to use the other parent's religion against him or her.
In many cases, one parent has argued that the other practices a religion
that is not in the best interests of the child, but the courts have generally
refused to examine a parent's religion except when presented with clear
evidence that particular religious practices pose a threat to the life of the
child.4 1 In other cases, courts have refused to determine whether a
custodial parent violated prenuptial or divorce agreements mandating
that children be raised according to the commands of a particular
religion. For instance, Zummo v. Zummo 142 involved the construction
137. Id. at 70.
138. Id.
139. See Basich v. Bd. of Pensions, 540 N.W.2d 82, 86, 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(dismissing breach of contact action); Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church,
Inc., 640 N.E.2d 681, 684 (Il. App. Ct. 1994) (same); Breitowitz, supra note 23, at 346, 348;
Lawrence M. Warmflash, The New York Approach to Enforcing Religious Marriage
Contracts: From Avitzur to the Get Statute, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 234-35 (1984); Lindsey
E. Blenkhorn, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts: Interpreting Mahr
Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 189,
192 (2002); Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Article, Civil Enforceability of Religious
Prenuptial Agreements, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 359, 373 (1999); Overstreet, supra
note 23, at 263; Jodi M. Solovy, Comment, Civil Enforcement of Jewish Marriage and
Divorce: Constitutional Accommodation of a Religious Mandate, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 493,
511-12 (1996).
140. See generally Cunningham, supra note 23, at 53; Karel Rocha, Should Religious
Upbringing Antenuptial Agreements Be Legally Enforceable?, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 145 (2000); Martin Weiss & Robert Abramoff, The Enforceability of Religious
Upbringing Agreements, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 655, 656 (1992); Jordan C. Paul,
Comment, "You Get the House. I Get the Car. You Get the Kids. I Get Their Souls. " The
Impact of Spiritual Custody Awards on the Free Exercise Rights of Custodial Parents, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 583 (1989); Jocelyn E. Strauber, Note, A Deal Is a Deal: Antenuptial
Agreements Regarding the Religious Upbringing of Children Should Be Enforceable, 47
DUKE L.J. 971 (1998); George G. Blum, Annotation, Religion as Factor in Visitation
Cases, 95 A.L.R. 5TH 533 (2002).
141. See Weiss v. Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 342, 346-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Kendall
v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (Mass. 1997); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1140,
1144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). See generally Weiss & Abramoff, supra note 140, at 655-56.
142. 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
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of a divorce order prohibiting the husband from taking the children "to
religious services contrary to the Jewish faith. 1 43 After the father took
the children to Catholic services, the mother sought to enforce the order,
but the Pennsylvania Superior Court held the dispute nonjusticiable:
The father is prohibited from taking his children to "religious
services contrary to the Jewish" faith. What constitutes a
"religious service"? Which are "contrary" to the Jewish faith?
What for the matter is the "Jewish" faith? Orthodox,
Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionist, Messianic,
Humanistic, Secular and other Jewish sects might differ widely
on this point .... Both the subject matter and the ambiguities
of the order make excessive entanglement in religious matters
inevitable if the order is to be enforced)"4
The court thus held that religious upbringing agreements are
unenforceable because it is constitutionally impermissible for courts to
determine what practices are consistent or inconsistent with religious
faiths.
3. Tort Cases
Courts have refused to adjudicate negligence claims against churches,
religious therapists, and faith healers whenever the reasonableness of an
actor's conduct can be said to depend in any measure on religious
standards.145 For instance, courts have held negligence claims against
143. Id. at 1142.
144. Id. at 1146.
145. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (dismissing a
malpractice claim against pastor for allegedly touching twelve-year-old girl during pastoral
counsel and holding that adjudicating a clergy malpractice claim would unconstitutionally
"require the Court or jury to define and express the standard of care to be followed by
other reasonable Presbyterian clergy of the community"); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d
275, 285 (Colo. 1988) (dismissing clergy malpractice claim); DeBose v. Bear Valley Church
of Christ, 890 P.2d 214, 222 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a cleric could not be held
liable for malpractice if his massage of the minor plaintiff "was engaged in solely in a
sincere effort to facilitate the minor's communication with God"); Korean Presbyterian
Church v. Lee, 880 P.2d 565, 570 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (dismissing tort of outrage claim
brought against church for statements made during excommunication); see also Martin R.
Bartel, Clergy Malpractice After Nally: "Touch Not My Anointed, and to My Prophets Do
No Harm," 35 VILL. L. REV. 535, 567 (1990); Constance Frisby Fain, Clergy Malpractice:
Liability for Negligent Counseling and Sexual Misconduct, 12 MiSs. C. L. REV. 97, 101,103
(1991); Sue Ganske Graziano, Clergy Malpractice, 12 WHITrIER L. REV. 349, 355 (1991);
Idleman, supra note 15, at 219,228-29,231-32,234-38; C. Eric Funston, Note, Made Out of
Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W. L.
REV. 507, 517-18, 520, 526, 529, 533 (1983); James K. Lehman, Note, Clergy Malpractice: A
Constitutional Approach, 41 S.C. L. REV. 459, 460, 472 (1990); Pomeroy, supra note 23, at
1141, 1143 (1992); Kelly Beers Rouse, Note, Clergy Malpractice Claims: A New Problem
for Religious Organizations, 16 N. KY. L. REV. 383, 384 (1989).
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religious counselors and spiritual healers to be nonjusticiable because
they would require courts to undertake prohibited inquiry into the
standard of care applicable to religious counselors. 4 1 Similarly, courts
have held that they cannot adjudicate claims that a church negligently
hired or supervised a priest accused of molesting children because the
standard of care applicable to a church in its employment decisions might
require examination of religious doctrines. 47
4. Consumer Fraud Cases
Courts have held that consumer fraud statutes prohibiting the false
labeling of food to be kosher (i.e., ritually fit for consumption under
Jewish dietary standards) violate the Establishment Clause, among other
reasons, because the enforcement of such statutes may require courts to
determine whether food was prepared in compliance with Jewish law'
48
Although courts plainly have power to determine whether food is
properly labeled organic or low-fat, and older cases had upheld state
kosher laws,1 49 all courts to address the issue since Smith have held those
laws to be unconstitutional because they would require courts to
interpret religious doctrine. ° In the words of one court, to determine
146. Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319, 1324 (111. App.
Ct. 1986)
[A]djudication of the present case would require the court to extensively
investigate and evaluate religious tenets and doctrines: first, to establish the
standard of care of an "ordinary" Christian Science practitioner; and second, to
determine whether [the defendants] deviated from those standards. We believe
that the first amendment precludes such an intrusive inquiry by the civil courts
into religious matters.
Id.
147. Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246-47, 250 (Mo. 1997) (dismissing negligent
hiring claim against Catholic church); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 437, 440-42, 447
(Wis. 1997) (dismissing negligent supervision claim against Catholic church). See generally
Idleman, supra note 15, at 229-30, 234-35.
148. Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415. 425-27 (2d Cir.
2002); Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1343-46 (4th
Cir. 1995); Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc. v. New Jersey, 608 A.2d 1353, 1359-60, 1363
(N.J. 1992); cf Catherine Beth Sullivan, Comment, Are Kosher Food Laws
Constitutionally Kosher?, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 201, 237-40, 245 (1993). See
generally Stephen F. Rosenthal, Food for Thought: Kosher Fraud Laws and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 972 (1997); Mark A.
Berman, Article, Kosher Fraud Statutes and the Establishment Clause: Are They Kosher?,
26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (1992); Karen Ruth Lavy Lindsay, Note, Can Kosher
Fraud Statutes Pass the Lemon Test?: The Constitutionality of Current and Proposed
Statutes, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 337, 362-64, 369 (1998); Gerald F. Masoudi, Comment,
Kosher Food Regulation and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 667, 683-85, 687-88 (1993).
149. See, e.g., People v. Goldberger, 163 N.Y.S. 663, 665-67 (N.Y. Ct. Spec. Sess. 1916).
150. See supra note 148.
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whether food is kosher "would require the civil courts to engage in the
forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church doctrine.'. 1
5. Employment Discrimination Cases
Employment discrimination claims against religious organizations are
frequently dismissed because they might call upon courts to evaluate
whether religious doctrines played any role in the challenged
employment decision. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,152
religious organizations cannot be sued for discriminating on the basis of
religion, but they remain subject to liability for discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, or national origin."' When an employee brings a
discrimination claim against a religious employer, however, the employer
may assert that the challenged employment decision was not made on the
prohibited basis of race, sex, or national origin, but instead was made
because the plaintiff did not adhere to the organization's religious
standards.114  Courts have ruled discrimination claims nonjusticiable
whenever religious employers raise such a defense.15 As one court held,
"Once the church states that the decision was, even in part, doctrinal,
then the court would either have to invoke the First Amendment and
cease inquiry or enter into the impermissible activity of analyzing church
doctrine and perhaps weighing the importance of a particular area of the
doctrine.'
, 15 6
151. Commack, 294 F.3d at 425 (holding that the kosher regulations "require the State
to take an official position on religious doctrine"); Barghout, 66 F.3d at 1337 ("'To reach
thosc questions would require the civil courts to engage in the forbidden process of
interpreting and weighing church doctrine."' (citing and quoting Presbyterian Church v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969))).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (2000).
153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -2 (2002); see, e.g., Brant, supra note 23, at 283-85; G.
Sidney Buchanan, The Power of Government to Regulate Class Discrimination by
Religious Entities: A Study in Conflicting Values, 43 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1195, 1201, 1217-18
(1994); Coon, supra note 23, at 486-87; Gayle A. Grissum, Church Employment and the
First Amendment: The Protected Employer and the Vulnerable Employee, 51 MO. L. REV.
911, 924 (1986); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case
of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 392, 396 (1987); Jane Rutherford,
Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment
Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1057-58, 1078, 1097, 1127
(1996).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2.
155. Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1133-34 (Colo. 1996); see also, e.g., Himaka v.
Buddhist Churches, 917 F. Supp. 698, 704-05, 708-09 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (dismissing Title VII
claim against religious group because it would require examination of religious question);
Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391, 396, 399-401 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (dismissing state
employment discrimination action).
156. Vogt, 908 P.2d at 1129.
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6. Cases Involving Statutory Construction
The prohibition on judicial resolution of religious questions has led
courts to construe statutes not to require prohibited judicial inquiries
into religion and to invalidate statutes that require such inquiry. For
instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held
unconstitutional a statute that prohibited employers from requiring an
employee to take action that violated his or her religious creed.5 7 In the
case that reached the Massachusetts high court, Catholic employees
objected to working on Christmas and brought suit under the statute.
5 8
The employer defended on the ground that Catholicism does not
prohibit adherents from working on Christmas.'59 The Massachusetts
court held that the dispute was not justiciable because it would have
called on a court to determine what practices are required by
Catholicism.
6 0
II. AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF
RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS IS NEITHER ADVISABLE NOR POSSIBLE
Before turning to an exploration of the two rationales that have been
offered to support a prohibition on judicial examination of religious
questions, this Part shows that a prohibition on judicial inquiry and
resolution of religious questions cannot feasibly be applied in an absolute
manner. In a variety of contexts, courts routinely resolve factual
157. Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1298, 1304 (Mass. 1996).
158. Id. at 1299-300.
159. Id. at 1300.
160. Id. at 1304. Similarly, a conflict in the courts arose over the scope of permissible
judicial inquiry into religious questions under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), enacted by Congress to overturn Smith, which prohibits the government from
taking actions that "substantially burden" the exercise of religion unless the actions
further a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved by less restrictive means. 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2000). Some courts have held that government action can be said to
impose a substantial burden on the plaintiff's exercise of religion only when the religious
practice at issue is "mandated" by the claimant's religion and is "central" to that religion.
See, e.g., Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Other courts
criticized that approach, holding that such judicial inquiry is barred by the Constitution,
and instead adopted the conclusion that any religiously motivated action is protected by
RFRA. See, e.g., Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated and
remanded by 522 U.S. 801 (1997); Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1444 (W.D. Wis.
1996), affd, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded by 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
See generally Seeger, supra note 24. In 2000, Congress resolved the issue by amending
RFRA to provide that it protects "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by,
or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000). Some
commentators have nonetheless argued that RFRA is unconstitutional even as applied to
the Federal Government because it requires prohibited inquiry into religion. See, e.g.,
Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for RFRA and
Separation of Powers, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 5 (1995). But see Magarian, supra note 24.
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questions about the content and validity of religious doctrines and
practices. Courts make extensive determinations about religious
doctrines and practices in determining whether they qualify as
"religious" under the Constitution and various statutes protecting and
accommodating religion. 16 Courts also make determinations about the
content of religion in assessing a wide range of religious programs
provided by the government, such as those offered in prisons and in the
military.162  Furthermore, because there is no recognized test for
distinguishing secular from religious questions, courts frequently address
questions presented in secular terms in a manner that implicitly adopts a
governmental position on the validity of religious doctrines and beliefs."3
As these examples demonstrate, it is not possible to understand the
prohibition on judicial assessment of religious questions to be absolute.
Courts cannot plausibly adopt the position characterized by Michael
McConnell as "religion blindness," in which they would take no account
of religious practices and beliefs.'64 Instead, the question properly to be
addressed is which religious questions courts can competently resolve
without violating the Religion Clauses.
A. Courts Examine Religious Practices and Doctrines in Determining
Whether a Practice or Doctrine Is "Religious"
Notwithstanding the apparent prohibition on judicial examination of
religious questions, courts routinely undertake factual inquiry into
religious practices and doctrines in determining whether a set of beliefs
and practices amounts to a "religion." Although no agreed meaning of
the term "religion" has emerged under the First Amendment, a problem
161. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 210 (1963); Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1084-85, 1096-97 (6th Cir. 1987).
162. See Quigg v. Armstrong, 106 Fed. Appx. 555 (9th Cir. 2004); Anderson v. Laird,
466 F.2d 283, 299-301 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Clanton v. Glover, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365-66
(M.D. Fla. 2003).
163. Donald A. Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development, Part I. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 532-33
(1968).
164. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response
to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 689-91 (1992) (arguing that the Religion
Clauses require accommodation of religion, not formal neutrality). Dissenting in Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), Justice Rehnquist
recognized that a prohibition on judicial resolution of religious disputes cannot be applied
absolutely: "[W]hile there may be a number of good arguments that civil courts ... should,
as a matter of the wisest use of their authority, avoid adjudicating religious disputes to the
maximum extent possible, they obviously cannot avoid all such adjudications," id. at 735
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Levine, supra note 23, at 133-34.
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that has long vexed courts and commentators, 165 courts must nonetheless
decide what constitutes a religion in construing the state and federal tax
codes, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),166 the Free
Exercise Clause, state constitutions, and hundreds (if not thousands) of
statutes that give special treatment to religious bodies and religiousS 167
practices. Although determining what constitutes a religion "may
present a most delicate question," such determinations are necessary
because, as the Court has declared, "A way of life, however virtuous and
admirable" is not entitled to protection under the Religion Clauses "if it
is based on purely secular considerations." ' 68
Determining what constitutes a religion frequently requires extensive
factual examination of the content and scope of religious doctrines and
practices. Taking one example, in United States v. Meyers,'69 a defendant
charged with marijuana possession claimed that the prosecution violated
his rights under RFRA because he was a minister in the Church of
•• 171
Marijuana. In deciding whether the Church of Marijuana was a bona
fide religion and therefore entitled to protection under RFRA, the court
canvassed case law on the meaning of the term "religion" and catalogued
a set of factors that courts have employed: (1) whether the purported
religion addresses "[u]ltimate [i]deas" such as humanity's purpose or
165. The closest the Court has come to adopting a test for determining what
constitutes a religion was in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 165 (1965), in which the
Court employed two tests for determining religiosity in determining conscientious objector
status under the military draft law: a substantive test, asking whether a belief is "based
upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is... ultimately dependent"; and
a functional test, which asks whether a belief system "occupies in the life of its possessor a
place parallel to that filled by the God of those [religions] admittedly qualifying for the
exemption." Id. at 176. For a sampling of the large volume of academic commentary
addressing, proposing, and rejecting various tests and definitions of religion, see Jesse
Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579 (1982), and
George C. Freeman III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of
"Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983).
166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000).
167. See 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)(1) (2000) (providing that a person need not pay social
security taxes if he can show that "he is a member of a recognized religious sect or division
thereof and is an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or division by
reason of which he is conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any private
or public insurance"); 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2000) (protecting Native Americans from
prosecutions for peyote use if they can show that they used peyote for "bona fide
traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian
religion"); James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 (1992) (concluding that the terms
"religion" or "religious" appear over 14,000 times in state and federal statutes, and
religious exemptions appear in over 2,000 statutes).
168. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,215 (1972).
169. 906 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Wyo. 1995), affd, 95 F.3d 1475 (l0thCir. 1996).
170. Id. at 1495.
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place in the universe; (2) whether the purported religion includes
"[m]etaphysical [b]eliefs," which "address a reality which transcends the
physical and immediately apparent world"; (3) whether the purported
religion prescribes a moral or ethical system; (4) whether the purported
beliefs are "comprehensive," in that they seek "to provide the believer
with answers to many, if not most, of the problems and concerns that
confront humans"; and (5) whether the purported religion includes any
of the "[ajccoutrements of [rieligion," such as a founding prophet, sacred
writings, sacred sites, clergy, ceremonies, and holidays.17 The court then
proceeded to examine the beliefs and practices of the Church of
Marijuana in considerable depth and concluded that it was not a
religion. Dozens of similar cases can readily be found, in which a
statutory or constitutional right depends on judicial factfinding regarding
the content of a claimant's religion.1
73
As several commentators have noted, the Constitution cannot
plausibly be construed simultaneously to require protection for religion
while forbidding courts from making assessments of whether a doctrine
or practice is religious. Gregory Magarian has stated: "Forbidding such
judgments out of concern about judicial encroachment on religion would
amount to killing free exercise protection with kindness. By the same
token, if courts could not discern which practices are 'religious,' then
they could not credibly assess governmental actions under the
Establishment Clause.'1 4 Factual inquiry into the meaning and content
of religious doctrines and practices thus cannot plausibly be prohibited as
long as courts are called upon to construe and apply the Religion Clauses
and myriads of statutes giving special treatment to religion. '
171. Id. at 1502-03.
172. Id. at 1504-07.
173. See, e.g., Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 240, 242 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that
prisoners had a right to books published by the Nation of Islam, relying on expert
testimony that the books were of "crucial religious significance" and contained the
essential teachings of the Nation of Islam, without which adherents would not understand
how to pray); Wilson v. Moore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1350-54 (N.D. Fla. 2003) (examining
role of prayer pipe, smudging, drums, and headbands in plaintiff's religion in determining
free exercise claim); McBride v. Shawnee County, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (D. Kan.
1999) (holding that Rastafarians were not entitled to smoke marijuana in prison because,
unlike the use of peyote by certain Indian tribes, Rastafarian religion called for marijuana
use "whenever the mood strikes" and not in scheduled ceremonies).
174. Magarian, supra note 24, at 1960; see also Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of
American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an
Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 32 (2000) (arguing that "[tlhe Court cannot entirely
escape the definitional problem-that is, as long as the Court finds any content in the
religion clauses"); cf Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("It cannot be ignored that the First Amendment itself contains a religious
classification.").
175. See Magarian, supra note 24, at 1960.
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B. Courts Examine Religious Questions in Assessing the Government's
Provision of Religious Programs
The government itself provides religious services in restrictive settings,
such as prisons and the military. In these settings the Establishment
Clause has been understood to allow (if not require) the government to
hire chaplains, 176 serve religiously sanctioned food,177 exempt religious
practitioners from otherwise applicable rules, and generally make
available religious programs to a wide variety of religious practitioners.1
8
In providing for the religious needs of military personnel and prison
inmates, the government determines what programs are needed by
different religious communities and whether the programs it offers
adhere to religious standards. For instance, when a prison has offered a
Passover seder for Jewish inmates, prison officials have been called on to
determine whether a prisoner actually is Jewish and therefore entitled to
attend, a quintessentially religious determination.1 79 In administering
chaplaincy programs and in providing religiously sanctioned food, the
government must determine whether the food it serves and the chaplains
it hires adhere to religious law. 8° The government could not effectively
provide religious services to inmates and military personnel without
extensive inquiry into the content of religious doctrines.
C. The Difficulties in Distinguishing Religious from Secular Questions
Make an Absolute Prohibition on Examining Religious Questions
Impossible
If there is to be a religious question doctrine, there must be some sort
of standard for determining which questions are religious and therefore
out of judicial bounds. Baker v. Carr identifies six criteria for
identifying nonjusticiable political questions, 2  and cases and
commentary have elaborated various formulations for each criterion.1
3
Neither courts nor commentators, however, have elaborated criteria for
176. Julie B. Kaplan, Note, Military Mirrors on the Wall: Nonestablishment and the
Military Chaplaincy, 95 YALE L.J. 1210, 1210-11 (1986).
177. Jamie Aron Forman, Note, Jewish Prisoners and Their First Amendment Right to
a Kosher Meal: An Examination of the Relationship Between Prison Dietary Policy and
Correctional Goals, 65 B ROOK. L. REV. 477, 477-80 (1999).
178. Abraham Abramovsky, First Amendment Rights of Jewish Prisoners: Kosher
Food, Skullcaps, and Beards, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 241 (1994).
179. Greenawalt, supra note 128, at 462.
180. See Kaplan, supra note 176, at 1213-14; Forman, supra note 177, at 480-84.
181. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
182. Id. at 217.
183. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of
the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643 (1989) (describing various
formulations of the political question doctrine).
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identifying religious questions. Although courts routinely dismiss cases
on the ground that they would require examination of religious
questions, one searches in vain through the cases and the academic
literature for any test to distinguish religious from secular questions or
even any discussion of the need for such a test. Instead, courts and
commentators distinguish the questions that may be judicially resolved
from the prohibited category of religious questions without any
identifiable analysis.
The absence of any test for determining what questions are religious
derives only in part from the absence of an agreed meaning of the term
"religion." Even where it is clear that a case involves religion, it is not
always clear that the case raises any "religious questions." A case about
the tax status of a church may involve various questions touching on
religion, such as the criteria for church membership, the fundraising
activities of the church, and whether the church is properly characterized
as a religious entity, but not all questions involving religion are
understood to be "religious questions" that courts are barred from
addressing. If all questions touching on religion were off-limits to
judicial inquiry, religious entities and religious actions would be
absolutely immune from judicial consideration. Just as the political
question doctrine does not bar a court from considering actions
described as "political," so a religious question doctrine cannot bar all
consideration of religious practices and beliefs. T8
Given the undefined nature of the category of religious questions said
to be off-limits to judicial scrutiny, it is not surprising that the same types
of questions are perceived as religious in some contexts but secular in
others. For instance, Ballard holds that it would be unconstitutional for
courts to determine the truth or falsity of the claim that a person
possesses supernatural powers or communicates with the spirit of a
deceased saint,"" yet criminal defendants may be found insane or
incompetent to stand trial because they believe that they possess
supernatural powers or that they, or their victims, were possessed by
demons.186  When offered as evidence of insanity, belief in spirit
184. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 ("The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political
questions,' not one of 'political cases.' The courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide
controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional
authority.").
185. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 79-80, 87-88 (1944).
186. See, e.g., Archie v. State, 875 So. 2d 336, 338, 341 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)
(declaring that defendant was mentally ill and suffering under a "false belief system"
because she believed that God told her to kill her daughter, whom she believed was
possessed by Satan); Stevens v. State, 350 S.E.2d 21, 21-22 (Ga. 1986) (declaring defendant
to be "delusional" and acting under a "delusional compulsion" because he beat his wife to
death based on the belief that she was possessed by Satan and that, once beaten, she
[Vol. 54:497
Is There a "Religious Question" Doctrine?
possession has been unhesitatingly deemed to be "delusional" or part of
a "false belief system."' 87  Rather than declaring nonjusticiable the
validity of claims of demon possession, courts rely on such claims to
establish that the defendant is suffering from mental illness and should
be committed to a mental institution.'m In other contexts, courts have
generally upheld government regulation of fortune telling, astrology, and
communication with spirits, on the ground that such matters do not
involve religion. 89 Courts offer no analytical basis for distinguishing
supernatural claims that are religious (and therefore exempt from
judicial examination) from supernatural claims that are secular (and
therefore subject to government regulation). The distinction has meant,
however, that fraud claims may be pursued against astrologers, palm
readers, and mediums, but not against preachers and cult leaders.19
Moreover, when questions touching on religious doctrines present
themselves in what are understood to be secular contexts, courts
routinely resolve them in a manner that effectively, albeit indirectly,
amounts to a governmental declaration on the validity of religious
doctrines. This can be seen clearly in cases addressing the
constitutionality of teaching about Darwinian evolution in the public
schools. The Establishment Clause is understood to permit the
government to declare the theory of evolution to be true even though
such a declaration effectively amounts to a declaration that some
would rise again, rid of the devil); State v. Brown, 449 N.E.2d 449, 452 (Ohio 1983)
(declaring defendant to be insane because, at the time he killed his father, he believed
himself to be in touch with guardian angels and the devil).
187. People v. Hernandez, 994 P.2d 354, 356 (Cal. 2000) (stating that defendant was
"delusional" for believing that he was the "'white horseman' who would pass judgment on
everyone"); Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Wack, 551 N.E.2d 95, 95 n.1 (N.Y. 1989)
(committing a defendant to mental institution for disorder that caused him to kill his wife
and son based on the belief that they were possessed by the devil).
188. See, e.g., Wack, 551 N.E.2d at 95-96.
189. See Sarno, supra note 51 (collecting cases). But see Argello v. City of Lincoln, 143
F.3d 1152, 1152-53 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that city's interest in preventing fraud does not
justify municipal ordinance against fortune telling); Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959 F.
Supp. 1040, 1043 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (holding that city's attempt to ban public fortune telling
violates First Amendment free speech clause); Spiritual Psychic Sci. Church of Truth, Inc.
v. City of Azusa, 703 P.2d 1119, 1120-21 (Cal. 1985) (holding that prohibition on fortune
telling violates state free speech protection), overruled in part by Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45
P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002).
190. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.35 (McKinney 1999) (prohibiting fortune telling
for profit), with Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 224 Cal. Rptr. 817, 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that claim could not proceed challenging the psychological techniques of the
Unification Church because that would permit the jury to question the truth of the
church's religious doctrine), aff d in part and rev'd in part, 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988).
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religious doctrines of creation are false.' 9' Questioning this result, Justice
Black wondered whether governmental neutrality on religious matters
might be better served by keeping the government from saying anything
on subjects addressed by religion, such as the question of human origins:
If the theory [of evolution] is considered anti-religious, as the
Court indicates, how can the State be bound by the Federal
Constitution to permit its teachers to advocate such an "anti-
religious" doctrine to schoolchildren? . . . [Would] not the
removal of the subject of evolution leave the State in a neutral
position toward these supposedly competing religious and anti-
religious doctrines?'2
In Justice Black's view, constitutional difficulties arise not only when the
government treats religious doctrines to be true but also whenever the
government advances secular theories that conflict with religious
beliefs."'
Justice Black's position has not prevailed, however, and for good
reason: the government could hardly function if it were required to stay
neutral on all subjects addressed by religious doctrines because such
subjects know no limits. 9 4 Religions take varying positions on whether
human life begins at conception or at birth, whether women should be
free to work in traditionally male occupations, and whether homosexual
behavior is normal or is deserving of punishment, but the fact that
religious doctrines address these subjects has never been understood to
bar the Court from holding that, under the Constitution, human life
begins at birth, 195 that excluding women from military schools causes196
identifiable societal harms, and that criminalizing homosexual sodomy
is irrational.9  Thus, notwithstanding Ballard's rule against judging the
truth or falsity of religious claims,'9 courts effectively may issue
191. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591 (1987) (declaring unconstitutional a
Louisiana statute mandating the teaching of "creation science" in public schools whenever
the theory of evolution is taught). Not only may the state teach evolution, it cannot
prohibit its teaching. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (holding that the state
cannot seek to prevent the teaching of evolution on the ground that it conflicts with the
doctrine of the "'Divine Creation of man"'). The Establishment Clause does not allow a
state to "blot out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical
account, literally read." Id.
192. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 113 (Black, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 112-14 (Black, J., concurring).
194. See Conkle, supra note 174, at 29-31.
195. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159-62 (1973).
196. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 554-58 (1996).
197. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S 558, 575-78 (2003).
198. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
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governmental declarations that certain religious beliefs are false. Indeed,
the courts would be paralyzed if they could not do so.
As these examples show, it is not possible, or desirable, to prohibit
courts from examining the content of religious doctrines. Courts do so
routinely and could not, as a practical matter, avoid doing so.
III. JUDICIAL FEAR OF THE NONRATIONAL: THE INSTITUTIONAL
COMPETENCE OF COURTS TO ADDRESS RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
As with the political question doctrine, the prohibition on judicial
resolution of religious questions is based in large part on the concern that
courts lack the institutional competence to resolve certain questions.
That was the view of James Madison;99 it formed the central ground for
the Court's 1872 decision in Watson;200 and the Court has repeatedly
articulated this rationale ever since.201  As it has recently been
characterized by the Court, however, the prohibition against deciding
religious questions is much broader than the political question doctrine,
which prohibits courts from making political decisions but does not
prohibit courts from determining what decisions have been made by the
political branches. This Part seeks to demonstrate that, while the
resolution of normative questions about religion (e.g., Is a religious belief
true or valid? Is a religious practice effective?) may frequently lie
beyond judicial competence, positive questions about religion (e.g., What
does a religious tradition say on a particular subject? Is a religious
practice considered an important or central one by those who engage in
it?) do not exceed judicial competence, and such questions can be
resolved using ordinary tools of judicial factfinding.
199. Madison, supra note 19.
200. Watson v. Jones, 8 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871) ("It is not to be supposed that
the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious
faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own.").
201. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) ("What principle of law
or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is
'central' to his personal faith?"); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) ("It is
not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds."); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 458 (1988) (stating that
requiring courts to decide whether litigants correctly interpret religious doctrines "would
cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play"); Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("[lIt is not within the judicial function and judicial competence
to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceive[s] the
commands of their common faith."); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 714 n.8 (1976) ("Civil judges obviously do not have the competence of
ecclesiastical tribunals in applying the 'law' that governs ecclesiastical disputes.").
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A. Judicial Incompetence to Resolve Normative Religious Questions
Courts are said to lack competence to answer political questions
because there are no "judicially discoverable and manageable standards"
for answering them.2  Courts cannot determine whether to declare war,
impose taxes, appoint officers, or sign treaties, because such questions
call for "determination[s] of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. '20 3
The same may be true for normative questions about religion, as there
are no standards for courts to apply in deciding whether a religious belief
is valid or true, what religious practices should be followed, or how a
religious body should be organized. Such questions cannot ordinarily be
resolved using the objective, rational, and empirical tools of law, and the
Court has therefore been correct to conclude that courts lack
competence to resolve such questions.
Outside the context of religion, one is hard pressed to find a subject
matter about which courts have declared themselves categorically
incompetent to find facts. Judges and juries make determinations on
complex and arcane questions of science, economics, and psychology,
subjects for which they lack any training. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , the Court expressed great confidence in the
abilities of judges and juries to resolve such esoteric questions.20 ' The
difficulty of answering questions has provided no basis for declaring
206
courts incompetent to do so.
Given the courts' profound confidence in their factfinding abilities, the
recognition that some questions cannot be solved using the tools of law
represents a rare expression of judicial humility. In his dissenting
opinion in Ballard, Justice Jackson articulated this point:
If religious liberty includes, as it must, the right to communicate
[religious] experiences to others, it seems to me an impossible
task for juries to separate fancied ones from real ones, dreams
202. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
203. Id.
204. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
205. Id. at 595-96. Daubert thus rejected the argument that abandonment of the
"general acceptance" test for the admission of scientific evidence "will result in a 'free-for-
all' in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific
assertions," describing the argument as "overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the
jury and of the advcrsary system generally." Id.
206. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943) ("We cannot,
because of modest estimates of our competence in [particular fields], withhold the
judgment that history authenticates as the function of this Court when liberty is
infringed."); cf Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 613 n.2 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The
First Amendment's Religion Clauses, however, are meant to protect churches and their
members from civil law interference, not to protect the courts from having to decide
difficult evidentiary questions.").
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from happenings, and hallucinations from true clairvoyance.
Such experiences, like some tones and colors, have existence for
one, but none at all for another. They cannot be verified to the
minds of those whose field of consciousness does not include
religious insight. °7
In this view, religious questions lie beyond the competence of courts
because they cannot be verified through reason and empirical evidence.'
8
Courts cannot answer religious questions on the terms used by religions
because, as Bruce Ackerman has stated, the liberal state is "[dleprived of
divine revelation," and decisions cannot be made "on the basis of some
conversation with the spirit world.,
20 9
The institutional competence rationale for prohibiting judicial
resolution of religious questions is thus based on a conception of legal
210
and religious questions as requiring distinct epistemologies. Judicial
tools available for answering factual and legal questions have long been
understood to be limited exclusively to the rational, objective, and
empirical.2  Courts may attempt to answer scientific questions even
207. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714-15 (1976) ("[I]t is the
essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be accepted as
matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by objective criteria."(footnote
omitted)); PAUL G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1964) ("Not only is
[religion] by its nature not subject to a test of validity determined by rational thought and
empiric knowledge, but a principal purpose underlying religious liberty is to remove the
question of what is true religion from the domain of the secular authority.").
208. Cf Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603 (holding that the neutral-principles approach to
resolving property disputes among religious factions "relies exclusively on objective, well-
established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges").
209. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 103, 127 (1980);
see also Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 24 (2000) ("'Faith' is distinguished from 'reason,' and 'reason' is said to be the
hallmark of liberal governance. "(footnote omitted)).
210. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 209, at 23-24 (characterizing Madison's statement
that a civil magistrate is not a "competent Judge of Religious Truth" to imply "an
epistemic, as opposed to an institutional, basis for the special place of religion under
liberal democracy").
211. See EDWARDO COKE, 1 THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 179 (photo. reprint 1986) (1797) ("Common Law .. . is the absolute
perfection of reason."); THE QUOTABLE LAWYER § 126.7, at 300 (Elizabeth Frost-
Knappman & David S. Shrager eds., revised ed. 1986) ("[L]aw is reason free from
passion." (quoting ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (c. 322 B.C.))); id. at 301 ("Law is a regulation in
accord with reason." (quoting THOMAS ACQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (c. 1258-
1260))); Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 789 (1990)
(arguing that the judicial method should be "entirely rationalistic"); Louis Henkin, Morals
and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 411 (1963) ("The
domain of government ... is that in which social problems are resolved by rational social
processes, in which men can reason together, can examine problems and propose solutions
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without scientific training because the tools of law are consonant with
212those of science. Judicial decisions that cannot be explained in rational
terms, in contrast, are not considered acceptable. For this reason, Justice
Potter Stewart's famous dictum that defining pornography may be
impossible yet "I know it when I see it," received considerable derision,
as it suggested that legal conclusions could be based on gut feeling,
unmediated by rational explanation.213 In contrast to ordinary questions
of fact, religious questions are understood to lie beyond judicial
competence because they do not depend on the logic of law. Instead,
religious questions may be answered on the basis of faith, mystical
214
experiences, miracles, or other nonrational sources.
The conception of law and religion as employing inherently distinct
methodologies oversimplifies both law and religion.215  As Larry
Alexander points out, religious beliefs are frequently grounded on the
same types of evidence and reasoning as secular beliefs. For instance, a
Christian believer in God and the miracles of the Bible may base her
beliefs on the "number of witnesses, their independently tested
reliability, and the number of intelligent people who accept these
accounts as true."2 6  Similar reasoning and evidence is often used to
support secular beliefs for which one lacks first-hand observation, such
as, in Professor Alexander's examples, the "beliefs that Washington was
the first president, that Kinshasha is the capital of Zaire, that Mars hit
sixty-one home runs, and that the speed of light is constant." '217
capable of objective proof or persuasion, subject to objective [inquiry] by courts and
electors.").
212. See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 539
(1980) (stating that factual judgments must be based on "practices of common sense and
science"); cf Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993)
("[T]he word 'knowledge' connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation. The term 'applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred
from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds."' (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1252 (1986))).
213. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
214. Such is the view, for instance, of Joanne Brant, who construes Smith to be based
on the proposition that "[r]eligion encompasses the mystic, spiritual aspects of human
nature, while law answers to the less esoteric demands of logic and tradition. By this
reasoning, any attempt to measure the worth of a religious claim by the yardstick of
rational argument and precedent is doomed to fail." Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme
Court at Its Word: The Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L.
REV. 5,20 (1995).
215. Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 763, 768-69 (1993). As Professor Alexander points out, "Some of
religion's strongest supporters load the dice against religion by deeming it the realm of
'faith' as opposed to 'reason."' Id. at 770 n.20.
216. Id. at 768.
217. Id. at 769.
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Conversely, legal conclusions, like religious ones, may derive from
nonrational sources. As Paul Gewirtz has argued, defending Justice
Stewart's "I know it when I see it" dictum, law "includes knowledge that
cannot always be explained, but that is no less valid for that. 2. 8
Professor Gewirtz points to such nonrational elements as imagination,
courage, compassion, intuition, and eloquence. 19 Other scholars, notably
Kent Greenawalt, have argued that certain questions demanding
governmental resolution, such as abortion rights and animal rights,
cannot be resolved through reason alone, and require resort to
220
nonrational (or what he terms "religious") modes of thinking.
The conclusion that religion and law do not inherently resolve
questions through distinct methodologies does not, however, mean that
courts are institutionally competent to resolve normative religious
questions, such as the validity of religious beliefs or the proper
organization of religious bodies. Religious freedom means that religious
beliefs may be based on any methodology that seems appropriate to the
221individual or religious group. So, while an individual may base her
religious beliefs and practices on the same types of logic and evidence
available in the courtroom, such questions need not be resolved in that
way. Religion is not unique in this respect. As Judge McConnell has
explained, there are numerous categories of secular questions that, like
religious questions, are not susceptible to judicial resolution due to their
uniquely private or idiosyncratic nature. Just as Madison proclaimed
that civil magistrates are not competent to determine religious truths,
"there is no reason to suppose that the civil magistrate is a competent
judge of artistic merit. ' ' 122 Similarly, "religion, like love, is a judgment
most of us prefer to make for ourselves.""' Thus, while there may be
some normative religious questions that could be resolved through resort
to ordinary judicial tools, the category is defined by its susceptibility to
resolution by modes of thinking and types of evidence outside the
218. Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105 YALE L.J. 1023. 1023, 1044
(1996).
219. Id. at 1033.
220. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Law Making, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352,
371 (1985); see also HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 136 (1981)
("There is no neutral conception of rationality .... ").
221. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714-715 (1976)
("[I]t is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be
accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by objective criteria."
(footnote omitted)).
222. McConnell, supra note 209, at 25; see also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.").
223. McConnell, supra note 209, at 27.
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ordinary range of judicial decisionmaking. As a result, the courts have
been correct to conclude that they lack institutional competence to
resolve normative religious questions.
B. Judicial Competence to Determine Positive Religious Questions
In Smith, the Court reasoned that judicial resolution of positive
questions about religion, such as whether a religious practice is
considered central or important to practitioners of the religion, should be
prohibited for the same reason that courts should not make normative
judgments about religious beliefs: "Judging the centrality of different
religious practices is akin to the unacceptable business of evaluating the
relative merits of differing religious claims., 2 4 In a fundamental way,
however, judicial examination of positive questions about religion is not
akin to judicial examination of normative religious questions. To
describe is not to judge, and the determination of what beliefs people
hold does not require a determination of whether those beliefs are
125
correct. Judicial examination of the content of religious doctrine is
more akin to judicial determinations of the content of foreign law: when
a court determines what the law of England or Italy is, it does not judge
the validity of those countries' laws or endorse the policies behind those
laws. Courts are just as capable of determining what Judaism or
Hinduism have to say as they are at determining what the laws of Israel
or India are. This can readily be seen in cases in which courts have
determined the content of the law of theocratic states, such as the Islamic
Republic of Iran, where religious law governs.2 26
The clearest demonstration of judicial competence to undertake fact-
finding about the content of religious doctrine and practices is, as
discussed above, that courts routinely undertake extensive fact-finding
into the content of religious doctrines and practices in determining
whether a practice or doctrine is "religious" and therefore subject to the
protections of the Religion Clauses and statutes addressing religion. In
undertaking such inquiry, courts routinely examine the content of a
purported religion's beliefs and practices, its ethical teachings, its
224. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. See McConnell, supra note 128, at 1144 ("In such cases, the court is not judging
the 'merits' of religious claims but solely trying to determine what they are.").
226. For instance, in Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1992), an Iranian
citizen sought refugee status on the ground that as a convert to Christianity she faced a
real threat of persecution in Iran. Id. at 1131, 1133. Experts on Islamic law testified to
help the court determine how sharia law would treat converts like the plaintiff. Id. at
1133.
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ceremonies and holidays, and various accoutrements of religion . 2  As
Professor Magarian has concluded, it is only a difference of degree, not
of kind, between the judicial fact-finding necessary to determine whether
a practice or doctrine is "religious" and the fact-finding necessary to
determine whether a practice or doctrine is considered important or
central to the religion.
To be sure, religious beliefs and practices are frequently based on faith
or other nonrational sources, but determining what those beliefs and
practices are, or whether they are considered important, does not require
courts to employ anything other than ordinary fact-finding techniques.
Courts competently can assess-that is, describe-the content of
religious doctrines and practices without assessing their validity.
2 9
Taking what is perhaps a nonreligious example, suppose that a palm
reader agreed to provide a traditional palm reading, but a customer
refused to pay, claiming that the reading he received was unorthodox.
There is no reason to believe that a court would be incompetent to
resolve the palm reader's breach of contract claim. Each side could call
experts to testify on the techniques of palm reading, describing what they
consider to be traditional techniques. Treatises could be consulted.
Certain basic points would become clear-that one line is known as the
love line, another as the life line. Other aspects of palm reading might be
considered more controversial within the palm reading community.
Based on the evidence, and employing ordinary fact-finding standards, a
court could determine that certain practices are considered traditional
among palm readers, while others are considered unorthodox. It could
undertake such fact-finding without any need to determine whether palm
reading has any validity in describing personality traits, exposing the
227. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
228. Magarian, supra note 24, at 1959 ("The determinations about religious substance
necessary for strict scrutiny of accommodation claims differ only in degree from the most
basic judgments about what constitutes 'religion' within the meaning of the First
Amendment.").
229. Legal principles, no less than religious beliefs, may be based on unverifiable
premises, but that does not prevent courts from determining what those principles are or
how they should be applied. The recognition that law, like religion, may be based on
unverifiable premises formed the basis for a joke in Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in
Ballard, in which he characterized belief in "dispassionate judges" as a mystical and
unverifiable matter akin to belief in Santa Claus:
All schools of religious thought make enormous assumptions, generally on the
basis of revelations authenticated by some sign or miracle. . . . Religious
symbolism is even used by some with the same mental reservations one has in
teaching of Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter bunnies or dispassionate judges.
It is hard in matters so mystical to say how literally one is bound to believe the
doctrine he teaches ....
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 94 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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past, or predicting the future. That is, courts have the ability to discover
the rules and doctrines understood to govern nonrational areas without
making normative judgments about those rules and doctrines. Indeed,
courts have long been charged with discerning the positive law without
judging its wisdom.230
Institutional competence thus justifies the reluctance of courts to
determine the validity or truth of religious claims and doctrines, but it
cannot support a prohibition on judicial resolution of questions about the
content of religious doctrines and practices. Courts have competence to
apply processes of fact-finding to determine the contours of religious
doctrines, yet refuse to do so when a clergy person gets fired for failing to
provide traditional services, when a merchant sells food claimed to be
kosher, or when a parent fails to raise a child in an agreed religion.
There may be good reasons for courts to refuse to resolve such questions,
but a lack of competence is not one.
IV. DOCTRINAL ENTANGLEMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
OF COURTS TO ADDRESS RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
The prohibition on judicial resolution of religious questions reflects
not only a concern with the institutional competence of courts but also
the constitutional competence of courts relative to religious authorities,
that is, the conviction that the Religion Clauses leave the resolution of
religious questions to religious authorities, free from governmental
entanglement and interference."' As the Supreme Court has said, "[T]he
First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and
government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free
from the other within its respective sphere. ''232 This Part examines the
230. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Our individual appraisal of the
wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be
put aside in the process of interpreting a statute.").
231. In this way, too, the prohibition is akin to the political question doctrine, which
rests upon the conviction that the Constitution leaves certain decisions to be made by the
political branches, free from interference by the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-
Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990) (noting that the political question doctrine "is designed to
restrain the Judiciary from inappropriate interference in the business of the other
branches of Government"); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1. 7-8 (1959). Just as the political question doctrine
reflects a constitutional division of authority between the branches of government, the
Religion Clauses express a division of authority between secular and religious bodies.
232. Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948); see also TRIBE,
supra note 18 (stating that the Establishment Clause reflects the "concern that secular and
religious authorities must not interfere with each other's respective spheres of choice and
influence"); McConnell, supra note 209, at 29 (asserting that the Religion Clauses divide
power "between two jurisdictions: the earthly and the divine"). As with the separation of
political and judicial authority, the division of authority between government and religion
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extent to which judicial resolution of religious questions interferes with
the protected sphere of religion and thereby exceeds judicial authority.
First, it seeks to demonstrate that the Establishment Clause is best read
to prohibit courts from judging the truth or validity of religious beliefs,
but not to prohibit judicial resolution of positive questions about religion.
Second, this Part argues that the conclusion that courts may answer
positive questions about religion is unaffected by whether the question is
a matter of dispute or controversy within a religious community.
A. Prohibiting Judicial Resolution of Positive Questions About Religion
Cannot Be Squared with Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and Theory
It is easy to see why judicial resolution of normative religious questions
intrudes into the sphere of religion protected from government
meddling. The Religion Clauses give each church body, indeed each
individual, authority to decide for itself, herself, and himself what
religious doctrines to follow, which rituals to consider valid and
meaningful, and which practices to deem mandatory or optional.23 To
declare a religious claim to be true or false, valid or invalid, would
directly entangle the government in questions constitutionally assigned
to the religious sphere.3
On the other hand, judicial resolution of positive questions about
religion does not interfere with the authority of religious bodies or
individuals to decide what beliefs to hold, what doctrines to follow, and
what practices to observe. The government plainly cannot tell the
Catholic Church who should be Pope; but, it would be hard to find that a
court unconstitutionally meddles with the church by saying who the Pope
is. The government would unconstitutionally entangle itself in religious
matters if it allowed a jury to determine whether Guy Ballard actually
possessed supernatural healing powers because it would interfere with
the right of believers to decide that question freely, but there would be
can be understood in jurisdictional terms, under which the government would exceed its
jurisdiction if it decided religious questions. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,
733 (1871) (stating that questions of religious doctrine are "matters over which the civil
courts exercise no jurisdiction"); Esbeck, supra note 18, at 10-11; O'Brien & O'Brien,
supra note 33, at 85 (arguing that church and state are separate sovereigns, each of which
can act independently and exclusively within its sphere).
233. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion.").
234. In Justice O'Connor's formulation, the government would likewise be seen as
violating the Establishment Clause if it "endorses or disapproves" a religious message, as
the courts undoubtedly would do if they were to assess the validity of religious claims. See
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
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no interference with religion for the government to declare that Ballard's
followers believed him to have had such powers. Likewise, it would not
interfere with religion for a court to declare that Orthodox Jews believe
that the Torah prohibits them from eating pork, that Christians believe in
the divinity of Jesus, that the Cheyenne religion considers Devil's Tower
to be a sacred site, and that Buddhists disclaim the existence of the self.
Positive declarations about religion pose little or no threat of
interference with religion because religious bodies and individuals
remain entirely free to decide for themselves what to do and what to
believe, and they remain free even if the government mischaracterizes
their beliefs and practices.
A constitutional distinction between the government's power to make
normative and positive declarations on matters of religion has long been
understood to apply in public schools. On the one hand, public schools
violate the Establishment Clause when they require daily Bible readings
or the recitation of prayers because such requirements are understood to
be tantamount to a governmental embrace of the truth and validity of a
religious message.236 In contrast, the Establishment Clause allows public
schools to offer comparative religion classes, in which students study the
Bible, prayers, or other religious texts, as long as the religious material is
"presented objectively as part of a secular program of education.""23 It
has thus been recognized that, in schools, the government may make
positive but not normative declarations about religious matters. There is
no reason why the Establishment Clause should apply differently in
courts than in public schools, prohibiting judges from making positive
declarations about religion that would be acceptable if made by
teachers.236
235. See Laycock, supra note 128, at 16-17.
236. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam) (discussing the Ten
Commandments); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (discussing Bible
reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (discussing prayer).
237. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225; see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 607 (1987)
(Powell, J., concurring) ("Courses in comparative religion of course are customary and
constitutionally appropriate."); Stone, 449 U.S. at 42 (per curiam) (stating that the Bible
may constitutionally be studied "in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics,
comparative religion, or the like"); Leslie Griffin, "We Do Not Preach. We Teach."
Religion Professors and the First Amendment, 19 QUINN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2000); cf Locke v.
Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1313 (2004) (holding that the state does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause by prohibiting state funds from being used to pursue degrees in divinity:
"Training someone to lead a congregation is an essentially religious endeavor. Indeed,
majoring in devotional theology is akin to a religious calling as well as an academic
pursuit"). See generally Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in the Public Schools,
18 J.L. & POL. 329 (2002).
238. It may be tempting to say that declarations by judges about religion are
constitutionally different from the same statements made by teachers because the
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Not only the public schools, but Congress and the executive branch
more generally are also authorized to make positive assessments about
the content of religious beliefs and practices. The political branches are
understood to have authority to establish exemptions from generally
applicable laws for religious conduct, and they may do so based on
examination and assessment of religious practices and beliefs.239  For
instance, when Congress decided to exempt Native Americans from state
and federal laws criminalizing the use of peyote, it issued legislative
findings regarding the content of Native American religion: "The
Congress finds and declares that . . . for many Indian people, the
traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a religious sacrament
has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant in
perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures. ',241 If the political branches
could not make such positive declarations regarding the content of
religious practices and beliefs, the government could never act to
accommodate religion. To prohibit the courts from making the same
sorts of declarations would create the anomaly that the Religion Clauses
apply more strenuously to the courts than the political branches.
In addition, while judicial resolution of positive questions about
religion has been characterized as creating excessive "entanglement"
241between government and religion, that conclusion cannot be squared
with the development of "entanglement" as an Establishment Clause
resolution of cases may depend on such declarations. Unlike a professor's resolution of
religious questions, judicial resolution of religious questions, if allowed, would form the
basis of government action. Litigants could win or lose their jobs, monetary damages, or
custody of their children, based on a court's understanding or misunderstanding of their
religions. Cf ROBERT COVER, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND
THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203-38 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1995)
(arguing that the fundamental difference between legal and literary interpretation is that
the former provides justification for the state's use and threat of force). Yet the cases
adopting and applying the broad prohibition on judicial resolution of religious questions
make clear that the purely iterative act of resolving religious questions is itself understood
to be prohibited by the Constitution. See supra notes 73-94, 122-28 and accompanying
text.
239. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) ("[I]t is a permissible legislative purpose to
alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to
define and carry out their religious missions."); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[G]overnment [may] take religion into
account ... to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed.").
See generally McConnell, supra note 164. But see Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the
Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 55, 580-81, 587 (1991).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a) (2000).
241. See TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1231-32.
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test.2 42 The prohibition on governmental entanglement with religion has
never been understood to embody an absolute prohibition of interaction
between government and religion but instead reflects in some measure
the inevitability of such interaction, as only "excessive" entanglement
with religion is understood to violate the Establishment Clause.24 The
case law gives imprecise guidance on exactly what government
interaction with religion is considered excessive, but a rough standard
of what the Court has considered to be excessive may be gleaned from
the primary area in which the Court has employed excessive
entanglement as a standard: the recurring problem of government
monitoring of the religious content of programs receiving public funds.245
When public funds are provided to religious entities, governmental
bodies frequently seek assurance that the money is being used for secular
purposes and not to advance religion. 24 The Court has held that no
242. The current status of "entanglement" as an Establishment Clause test is
uncertain. Under the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), government action was said to be consistent with the Establishment
Clause when: (1) it has a secular purpose, (2) its principal effect does not advance or
inhibit religion, and (3) it does not foster "'an excessive . . . entanglement with religion,"'
id. at 612-13. Since then, however, the Court has called into question whether excessive
entanglement should be regarded as a separate test or an aspect of the effects test. See
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997). The status of the Lemon test itself is in
doubt, with a majority of justices apparently adopting Justice O'Connor's "endorsement"
test. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that the Establishment Clause
is violated whenever the government "endorses or disapproves of religion"); see also Kent
Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 8
SUP. CT. REV. 323,326-28 (1995).
243. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233 ("Not all entanglements, of course, have the effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion. Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and
we have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two. Entanglement must
be 'excessive' before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause." (citations omitted));
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 ("[T]otal separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some
relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable."); see also
Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745-46 (1976) ("A system of government that
makes itself felt as pervasively as ours could hardly be expected never to cross paths with
the church. . . . [A] hermetic separation of the two is an impossibility it has never
required.").
244. See Laycock, supra note 93, at 1392 ("Sometimes [entanglement] seems to mean
contact, or the opposite of separation; it has also been used interchangeably with
'involvement' and 'relationship.' Sometimes it seems to mean anything that might violate
the religion clauses." (footnotes omitted)).
245. Compare Sch. Dist. v, Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375 (1985) (discussing religious school
programs receiving public funds), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), and
Roemer, 426 U.S. at 739-40 (discussing public funding of private religious colleges), with
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947) (discussing public funds for bus
transportation to religious schools).
246. Because the government must "maintain a course of neutrality . . . between
religion and non-religion," the government cannot deny funding to an organization solely
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excessive entanglement arises when the government monitors the
content of a religious organization's services, as long as such monitoring
is not "pervasive" and does not involve continuous government
"surveillance" of religious entities . Under these cases, no excessive
entanglement with religion occurs from unannounced monthly visits by
government officials to assess whether a religious entity is using public
funds to promote religious or secular content, 48 or when religious entities
are required to prove the absence of religious content in its publicly
funded programming.249 As these cases establish, the government does
not interfere with religion merely by examining the content of services
because it is religious when it provides public funding for other organizations doing similar
work. Ball, 473 U.S. at 382. Compare Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988)
(upholding federal funding of agencies, including religious entities, to provide services
addressing teenage sexual problems), and Roemer, 426 U.S. at 746 (upholding state statute
providing subsidies to qualified colleges, including religiously affiliated institutions, stating
that "religious institutions need not be quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally
available to all"), and Everson, 330 U.S. at 3, 17-18 (approving busing services available to
both public and private school children), with Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23, 845-46 (1995) (holding that, where the government generally
allows private groups to use public school rooms after school hours it cannot deny the use
of such rooms to religious organizations).
247. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-20. For instance, in Lemon, the Court examined
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania programs that reimbursed private schools for the costs of
providing secular courses also offered in public schools. Id. at 606 07. The Court found
that the programs involved excessive entanglement with religion because the programs
required "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" of the
content of the courses taught by the private school teachers in order to ensure that the
courses were limited to strictly secular subjects and did not inculcate religion. Id. at 619.
In contrast, in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), the Court upheld a federal
program that provided construction grants to colleges and universities, including
religiously-affiliated institutions, but which specified that the funds could not be used to
construct buildings used for religious instruction, training, or worship, id. at 675, 689. The
Court found that the program did not foster excessive entanglement because it involved
only minimal government monitoring to ensure that buildings constructed with public
funds were used for secular purposes. Id. at 687 ("Such inspection as may be necessary to
ascertain that the facilities are devoted to secular education is minimal."). In one of its
most recent pronouncements, the Court held that no excessive entanglement resulted
from a government program involving intermittent monitoring of whether public funding
of remedial school teachers was being used for religious indoctrination. Agostini, 521 U.S
at 234. In short, excessive entanglement will only be found where there is ."pervasive
monitoring by public authorities"' of the religious content of programs provided by
religious organizations. Id. at 233-34 (citation omitted).
248. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
249. See, e.g., Tilton, 403 U.S. at 680 (finding no excessive entanglement where
religious institutions receiving public funding "presented evidence that there had been no
religious services or worship in the federally financed facilities, that there are no religious
symbols or plaques in or on them, and that they had been used solely for nonreligious
purposes").
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provided by religious bodies.20 No principle of entanglement that can be
gleaned from the cases supports the conclusion that judicial examination
of the content of religious doctrine should be considered any more
intrusive, or so inherently intrusive as to bar courts from examining
religious content in every case. In this context, "entanglement"
represents simply a label for the anxiety created by government
involvement in matters touching on religion."' It does not identify a
principle for prohibiting judicial fact-finding regarding religious matters.
B. Courts May Resolve Disputed Religious Questions Unless Doing So
Would Involve Normative Judgments on the Correctness of Religious
Views
Passages in several of the Supreme Court's opinions suggest that the
prohibition on judicial resolution of religious questions applies most
forcefully when courts are called upon to resolve controversies or
disputes over religious doctrines. For instance, in Thomas v. Review
Board ' 22 two witnesses disagreed over whether the doctrines of the
Jehovah's Witnesses are consistent with performing work for the
military,253 but the Court ruled that it was beyond judicial authority "to
inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly
perceived the commands of their common faith., 254 For the reasons
discussed above, it would violate the Establishment Clause principle of
neutrality for a court to decide that one side in a religious dispute takes
the normatively correct position. A court, therefore, could not
constitutionally resolve the disputed question of whether performing
military work is sinful. But the Constitution should not be read to
prohibit a court from determining what beliefs are actually held by
Jehovah's Witnesses, a question that can be addressed without
determining whether those views are correct.
250. E.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
251. Cf Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 84
MINN. L. REv. 589, 593 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under the
Religion Clauses is guided by two anxieties, an "anxiety of entanglement" and an "anxiety
of anarchy").
252. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
253. Id. at 711.
254. Id. at 716; see also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (stating that courts may
not interpret religious doctrines if doing so "would require the civil court to resolve a
religious controversy"); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709
(1976) ("[T]his case essentially involves not a church property dispute, but a religious
dispute."); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Mem'l Hull Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449 (1969) ("But First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church
property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over
religious doctrine and practice.").
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In order to address the free exercise question in Thomas, it was
unnecessary to determine what doctrines are held by the Jehovah's
Witnesses because the right to free exercise of religion guaranteed by the
First Amendment is an individual right, which does not depend on
whether an individual's religious beliefs accord with the other members
of his religion."' But in other cases the parties' rights may well depend
on an assessment of the religious beliefs of an organized religious body.
Suppose that a contract requires a minister to abide by the standards of
her church, but she is fired by the church board for presiding at a gay
wedding, in violation of the official doctrines of the church. The minister
or the board should be able to point to the official positions of the church
in challenging or defending the employment decision. A court may
determine whether the minister's action violated the church's standards
without in any way deciding whether those standards are correct. That
the church and the fired minister may disagree over whether those
standards are correct does not change the nature of the court's positive
inquiry, nor does it drag the court into undertaking a normative inquiry
into which side correctly perceives the faith.
In some cases, the answer to disputed positive questions about the
content of religious beliefs may be indeterminate and thus insufficient to
resolve the religious issues presented by a case. For instance, in Zummo
v. ZumMo, 2 6 discussed above, divorcing parents had agreed not to take
their children "to religious services contrary to the Jewish faith," and the
noncustodial parent took her children to Catholic services.257  The
religious question presented by Zummo-does "the Jewish faith" allow
non-ewis serice 2511Jews to attend non-Jewish religious services -- is a positive question, in
that it can be answered by describing Jewish beliefs without taking a
position on whether or not those beliefs are correct. The purely
descriptive answer to that question, however, is indeterminate, in that
some strains of Orthodox Judaism construe Jewish laws and traditions to
prohibit Jews from attending services in a Christian church, while
Reform, Reconstructionist, and Conservative Judaism take a contrary
position.259  A court could describe those differing beliefs but
constitutionally could say nothing more. Other than saying that there are
255. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 128, at 466 ("For most kinds of cases, there are
powerful reasons to adopt an individual's perspective, not the group's. It is the individual
who is seeking to engage in behavior; his or her convictions should matter the most.").
256. 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
257. Id. at 1141-42.
258. id. at 1146.
259. Cf. JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, CONFRONTATION § 11(3), reprinted in 6
TRADITION: A JOURNAL OF ORTHODOX THOUGHT (1964), http://www.bc.edu/research/
cjl/meta-elements/texts/articles/soloveitchik.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
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disagreements among the sects, a court could not determine that "the
Jewish faith" allows or forbids Jews to attend Christian services without
crossing the line into resolving the normative question of which Jewish
sect is correct. To answer that question would be tantamount to a
judicial endorsement of the doctrinal position of one sect at the expense
of others. As a result, the court could determine whether the
noncustodial parent violated the divorce agreement only if it could
determine that the Zummos had in mind a particular Jewish
denomination in setting out the terms of their agreement.
Disputes within a religious community highlight the difficulties that
may arise in distinguishing positive from normative questions about
religion. The application of the kosher food laws presents a good case in
point.' 6° It is possible to understand the question of whether food is
properly labeled to be kosher in either normative or positive terms. One
could view the question in normative terms as addressing the truth of the
religious claim that the food complies with the laws established by God
for the Jewish people. That appears to be the conclusion of courts that
have held such statutes unconstitutional. 26 Defenders of kosher food
laws have seen the question in positive terms, as addressing whether food
is kosher in the common meaning of that term, without in any way
162
addressing whether Jewish dietary laws have any legitimacy. As this
Article has argued, a court may not determine whether food actually is
ritually fit for consumption according to God's laws any more than it may
determine whether Devil's Tower actually is a sacred site, but a court
may constitutionally determine whether Jews believe the food to be
kosher just as it could determine whether the Cheyenne people consider
Devil's Tower to be sacred.
The distinction between a court's authority to resolve positive and
normative religious questions, while sometimes quite slippery, becomes
especially significant when there are disputes within a religious
community. For instance, Orthodox Judaism generally considers
swordfish to be unkosher, while Conservative Judaism considers it to be
kosher.263  A court constitutionally may answer only the positivequestion-whether swordfish is understood within the Jewish community
260. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1363 (N.J. 1992)
(concluding that kosher law is unconstitutional regardless of whether there is any religious
dispute over what food is kosher: "The laws of kashrut are intrinsically religious, whether
they are ambiguous or not and whether they are disputed or not. Religious doctrines
cannot be recast as secular principles simply because they are clear .... Nor do religious
doctrines become neutral simply because they are widely or even universally held.").
262. See supra note 148.
263. BLU GREENBERG, How TO RUN A TRADITIONAL JEWISH HOUSEHOLD 112
(1983); 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 27 (1996).
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to be kosher-the answer to which is indeterminate. For a court to
determine whether swordfish actually is kosher would require the court
to determine which set of rabbis are correct in their religious position, a
determination that entails a normative judgment on which religious
denomination correctly perceives God's commands. 264
While the answer to disputed questions over the scope or content of
religious beliefs may sometimes be indeterminate, the existence of such a
dispute should present no bar to judicial examination. Litigants may
readily gin up factual disputes over religious beliefs and practices,
making the existence of religious controversies too easily manipulable to
function as a threshold inquiry. Moreover, if the existence of disputes
over religious beliefs and practices were a threshold question, it would
only push the resolution of religious questions up a level of generality, as
courts would still be required to assess whether there could be any
plausible controversy over the religious issue, a question that itself would
call for examination of religious matters. In any event, courts cannot
feasibly avoid examining matters of religion over which disputes within a
sect exist. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU,2 65 for example, the Court
had to assess the religious significance of a Hanukkah menorah in
deciding whether a public display violated the Establishment Clause.
66
On this point there was conflicting evidence in the record, some
testimony suggesting that the menorah had become primarily a secular,, • • 267
object, other evidence suggesting its continued religiosity.
264. Although Kent Greenawalt does not employ the positive-normative distinction
advanced in this Article, it would appear that this distinction underlies his position on the
constitutionality of kosher food regulation. See Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 782.
Professor Greenawalt argues that courts may not adopt an Orthodox definition of
"kosher" where there are disputes between the Orthodox and Conservative communities
over whether food is kosher: "Such unequal treatment should be regarded as
denominational preference . . . [which] unjustifiably promotes Orthodox Judaism at the
expense of Conservatism." Id. at 810. In contrast, Grcenawalt asserts that a court could
uphold a fine imposed against a merchant with an idiosyncratic definition of what food is
kosher, id. at 793; in Greenawalt's example. someone who claims that any food prepared
in the right spiritual environment should be considered kosher, even pork, which Jewish
traditions have long emphatically considered unkosher. Id. In such a case, Greenawalt
concludes that a court could undertake a positive inquiry into deciding whether the use of
the term "kosher" comports with a common understanding of the term to mean
'acceptable according to traditional Jewish standards."' Id. In Greenawalt's view, a
court assessing that positive question would not be understood to endorse those standards:
"It does not say people should follow kosher requirements; it merely assists those who
have this belief in fulfilling it." Id. at 792. The latter hypothetical is troubling, however, in
that it suggests an idiosyncratic or minority religious position would receive less protection
than more established beliefs.
265. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
266. Id. at 613-621 (plurality opinion).
267. See id. (plurality opinion).
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Conceivably, a description of the religious significance of the menorah
could be understood to endorse one religious view at the expense of
another. But if courts could not resolve disputes over the religiosity of
an object or practice, they could not plausibly know what practices and
268beliefs are protected by the Religion Clauses.
CONCLUSION
The broad prohibition against judicial resolution of all religious
questions, positive or normative, is a recent innovation. While that
broad prohibition was first articulated in the church property cases of the
1960s and 1970s, its breadth only became clear in Smith. Since Smith, the
prohibition has been applied in innumerable contexts, with the
unexpected result that a broad swath of cases are now deemed
nonjusticiable merely because they would require courts to examine the
content of religious beliefs and practices. The rationales articulated for
this prohibition-the competence of courts to resolve religious questions
and the separationist principle embodied in the Establishment Clause-
support only the modest rule adopted in Ballard, that courts must not
purport to pass judgment on the merits of religious beliefs. These
rationales do not support the much broader rule, applied since Smith,
that courts must not attempt to resolve even positive questions about
religious practice or doctrine. Such a broad rule is not supported by logic
or history and, in any event, would be impossible to apply in the absolute
manner articulated by the cases.
The conclusion that courts are not broadly prohibited from resolving
positive questions about religious doctrines and practices does not mean,
however, that courts must necessarily resolve all such questions
whenever they arise. Certainly, there are circumstances when courts
properly refuse to resolve even positive religious questions for reasons
wholly apart from those used to support the broad prohibition discussed
in this Article. For instance, a cause of action under which a party raises
a religious question may not actually require the court to resolve the
question. In this regard, courts issued conflicting decisions over whether
RFRA protects only those religious practices that are both central to the
plaintiff's religion and mandated by that religion, with some cases
holding that the Constitution absolutely prohibits them from determining
whether religious practices are mandated by religion or whether religious
beliefs are central to a religion, a conclusion that should be rejected for
the reasons discussed in this Article. 29 It may well be, however, that the
text of RFRA does not require such inquiry, even if the Constitution and
268. See Magarian, supra note 24, at 1953; Conkle, supra note 174.
269. See supra note 160.
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judicial competence would allow it. Indeed, given that religious freedom
embodied in the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA is understood as an
individual right, and not in terms of institutional religions, cases arising
under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA should rarely call on courts
to decide between conflicting views about religious doctrines and
practices, as the individual claimant's understanding of his or her religion
should control.
270
There may also be cases in which the Religion Clauses bar courts from
taking certain actions based on a resolution of religious questions.
Suppose that a congregant donates a large sum of money to a Jewish
congregation on the stipulation that the congregation remain true to
Orthodox practices, but the congregation adopts a policy eliminating sex-
segregated seating and instituting mixed-sex seating. If the donor seeks
an injunction against the policy on the ground that mixed seating
conflicts with the traditional practices of Orthodox Judaism, the logic of
this Article suggests that there is no bar to a court deciding whether
Orthodox Judaism allows men and women to sit together during
religious services. The conclusion that a court is institutionally and
constitutionally competent to decide that factual question does not,
however, mean that no constitutional problems would arise if a court
were to issue an injunction against the practice of mixed-sex seating, as
such an injunction would almost certainly violate the free exercise rights
of the congregation and its members.
A court's authority to undertake fact-finding into positive questions
about religion is thus a distinct question from its authority to impose
remedies that may have the effect of inhibiting or promoting the exercise
of religion. The means by which courts should resolve whether a
proposed remedy may exceed the court's constitutional authority,
however, demonstrates the impossibility of prohibiting judicial resolution
of religious questions. In order to determine whether the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits the government from imposing an injunction against a
Jewish congregation from instituting same-sex seating, a court would
have to determine, among other things, whether such seating constitutes
the exercise of religion, a determination requiring courts to make
positive assessments about the doctrines and practices of religion. Thus,
the resolution of Free Exercise Clause cases, like many others, depends
on a court's determination of the content of religious beliefs and
practices. Such determinations do not exceed judicial competence and
cannot plausibly be considered to be prohibited by the Constitution.
270. Cf Greenawalt, supra note 128, at 466.
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